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I. SPEECH AS CONDUCT
When, if ever, should speech lose its First Amendment protection on the 
grounds that it’s really just conduct?  Let us set aside speech or expressive 
conduct that’s being restricted because of its noncommunicative aspects, for 
instance because the speakers are blocking traffic or are being too loud.1
Rather, let’s focus on situations where speech causes harm because of its 
content.
Consider, for instance, a book that explains how a crime can be 
committed.  May this speech be restricted on the grounds that it constitutes 
the “conduct” of aiding and abetting, and is thus not subject to First 
Amendment protection at all?  Or consider racist, religiously bigoted, or 
sexist statements that create an offensive work, educational, or public 
accommodations environment.  May they be freely restricted because they 
aren’t speech but rather the “conduct” of harassment?
There are at least three main kinds of such “it’s conduct, not speech” 
arguments.  First, some think speech should be treated as conduct when it 
has the same effects as harmful conduct, and is covered by a law that 
restricts all conduct that has those effects.  This can happen in many 
situations:
(a) Publishing a book that describes how to grow marijuana might 
constitute intentional or knowing aiding and abetting of crime.2
*
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1 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969) (upholding a restriction 
because it was “limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct”).
2 See infra note 25 (discussing how such liability might be imposed).
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(b) Publishing a newspaper article or Web page that points to an 
infringing site may constitute contributory copyright infringement.3
(c) Publishing a news story that reveals the name of a witness, and thus 
unintentionally helps a criminal intimidate or kill the witness, may 
violate laws that bar knowing, reckless, or negligent crime 
facilitation.4
(d) Publishing a news story that reveals the existence of a wiretap may 
help the wiretap targets escape justice, and may thus violate
obstruc tion of justice laws.5
(e) Teaching one’s child racist, pro-polygamy, or pro - or anti-
homosexuality views may (in the views of some family court 
judges) be against the best interests of the child, and may therefore 
lead to loss of custody or diminished visitation.6
(f) Saying things that create an offensive work, educational, public 
accommodation, or housing environment based on race, religion, 
sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation might violate 
antidiscrimination law.7
3
 Contributory infringement is generally defined as behavior that materially contributes 
to third parties’ copyright infringement, done with knowledge or reason to know that the 
behavior will contribute to that infringement.  See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 
Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996).  This literally covers the publication of pointers to 
infringing Web sites, as some cases and a statute, see Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating 
Speech ___ (in draft), have recognized.  The cases involved clickable links, but giving the 
URL of an infringing site in plain text would fit the contributory infringement definition, 
too.
4 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE § 115.00 (“A person is guilty of criminal facilitation . . . 
when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid . . . to a person who intends to commit a 
crime, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for 
the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony.”); Volokh, 
Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at ___ (citing other such laws); id. at ___ (citing 
cases where such publications have led to civil liability, though under the speech-specific 
invasion of privacy tort rather than under a speech-neutral crime facilitation theory).
5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (outlawing “corruptly . . . imped[ing] any official 
proceeding”); Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at ___ (citing authorities 
that treat helping a person escape as obstruction of justice).
6 See, e.g., Vilakazi v. Maxie, Mass. Probate Ct. No. 479549 (Aug. 7, 1975) (changing 
custody largely based on mother’s racist views), aff’d, 371 Mass. 406 (1976); Shepp v. 
Shepp, 821 A.2d 635 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (likewise as to father’s pro-polygamy views); 
J.L.P.(H) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. App. 1982) (likewise as to father’s pro-
homosexuality views); cf. In re E.L.M.C., 2004 WL 1469410 (Colo. App.) (reversing a trial 
court decision ordering a parent not to teach her child anti-homosexuality views, but 
leaving open the possibility that the order may be reentered if the trial court finds that “the 
child’s physical health would be endangered or the child’s emotional development 
significantly impaired”).
7 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the 
Clinton Administration, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299 (2000) (describing hostile 
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(g) Speaking out against a proposed group home for the mentally 
disabled might violate the Federal Housing Act’s ban on 
“interfer[ing] with any person in the exercise or enjoyment” of the 
right to be free from housing discrimination based on handicap.8
(h) Speech that helps the election of an anti-war candidate may violate 
treason law—which prohibits intentionally aiding the enemy in time 
of war—if the speaker thinks the enemy deserves to win the war.9
(i) Newspaper ads, billboards, or leafleting campaigns that praise jury 
nullification may be punishable under laws that prohibit all attempts 
to influence jurors.10
(j) Producing and distributing movies that stimulate copycat crimes 
may be found to be tortious under general negligence principles.11
(k) Giving children sexually themed material, or for that matter political 
material that most people would see as evil, may violate laws that 
ban “impair[ing] the . . . morals of . . . [a] child.”12
environment harassment law, and giving examples of its application to otherwise protected 
speech).
8 See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the Act, 
which primarily covers nonspeech activity, might be read as covering, for instance, 
“persuasive editorial[s] on a zoning dispute,” but holding that such a reading should be 
rejected because it “would quickly run afoul of the First Amendment”).
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (defining treason as including a citizen’s “adher[ing] to [the 
United States’] enemies, giving them aid and comfort”); Kawakita v. United States, 343 
U.S. 717, 736, 742-44 (1952) (holding that “adhering” simply requires an intention to help 
the enemy).
10 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-154 (“A person is guilty of tampering with 
a juror if he influences any juror in relation to any official proceeding . . . .”); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 918.12 (“Any person who influences the judgment or decision of any grand or petit 
juror . . . with intent to obstruct the administration of justice, shall be guilty of a felony . . . 
.”); State v. Springer-Ertl, 610 N.W.2d 768 (S.D. 2000) (holding that people could be 
punished for posting material urging jurors to acquit a particular defendant, but only if the 
speech was “designed to influence specifically jurors and persons summoned or drawn as 
jurors,” as opposed to speech “intend[ed] to inform the public or express a public opinion, 
regardless of whether jurors—drawn, summoned, or sworn—may be among the public”); 
id. at 778 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (concluding that a statute banning communication to 
jurors intended to influence the jurors’ decisions was a “content-neutral statute” that was 
“narrowly tailored to prevent criminal behavior” and was “unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression”).
11 See, e.g., Olivia N. v. NBC, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting 
negligence liability in such a case based on the First Amendment); Yakubowicz v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989) (same).  See also In re Factor 
VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation, 25 F. Supp. 2d 837, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(imposing negligence liability for the National Hemophilia Foundation’s negligently false 
statements about the safety of the blood supply, partly because of “the well-established 
principle that the protections of the First Amendment do not shield the press from laws of 
general applicability”).
12 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-21.  Many people plausibly view many kinds of 
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In all these cases, the speech would be restricted because of what it 
communicates—because its content informs, persuades, or offends 
people—and because of the harms that flow from this informing, 
persuasion, or offense.  Yet some say the First Amendment isn’t implicated, 
because the law punishes conduct, not speech:  “[S]peech which, in its 
effect, is tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct 
may itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to 
the constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”13 Others 
speech as impairing the morals of a child.  Cf., e.g., NASSAU (N.Y.) COUNTY LOCAL LAW
11-1992 (banning the sale to children under age 17 of trading cards depicting criminals, on 
the theory that such cards impair the “ethical and moral development of our youth”);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-42 (1968) (discussing a similar justification for 
restrictions on sexually themed material); European Union Council Directive of Oct. 3, 
1989 art. 22, para. 1 (“Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that 
television broadcasts by broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not include any 
programmes which might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral development of 
minors, in particular programmes that involve pornography or gratuitous violence.”).  Such 
a speech-specific restriction would of course trigger First Amendment scrutiny; the 
question posed by the hypothetical is whether the government could avoid such scrutiny by 
prosecuting such speech under a generally applicable law banning “impair[ing] the . . . 
morals of . . . [a] child.”
13
 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); see id. at 242 
(arguing that publishing a book with the intent to help readers commit crime is punishable 
under generally applicable “criminal aiding and abetting” law); Burns v. City of Detroit, 
660 N.W.2d 85, 94 (Ct. App. Mich. 2003) (concluding that hostile environment harassment 
law is constitutional because the state antidiscrimination statute “is essentially directed 
toward discriminatory conduct, and oral remarks such as those at issue here are ‘swept up 
incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech’”); Aguilar 
v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 (Cal. 1999) (plurality) (defending the 
injunction of speech under hostile environment harassment law partly because “A statute 
that is otherwise valid, and is not aimed at protected expression, does not conflict with the 
First Amendment simply because the statute can be violated by the use of spoken words or 
other expressive activity.”); Department of Corrections v. State Personnel Bd., 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 34, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (Sims, J., dissenting) (concluding that an employee’s 
berating a coworker for supposedly having been hired because of affirmative action created 
an “abusive work environment” and thus constituted “constitutionally unprotected 
conduct—unlawful discrimination—rather than protected expression”); Robinson v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (enjoining 
offensive speech in the workplace under a hostile environment theory because 
“[pornographic] pictures and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act 
as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment”); Doe v. University 
of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (dictum) (distinguishing “pure speech” 
from “sexually abusive and harassing conduct” such as workplace harassment); Trayling v. 
Board of Fire and Police Comm’rs, 652 N.E.2d 386, 395 (Ill. App. 1995) (defending sexual 
harassment rules partly on the grounds that “Prohibitions against sexual harassment are 
generally applicable laws,” though doing this in the special context of the government 
acting as employer); Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the 
Dissemination of Ideas and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. OF SCI. & TECH. 273, 
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argue that the generally applicable law should be treated as akin to a 
content-neutral restriction on expressive conduct, and thus fairly easily 
upheld under the deferential O’Brien test14 because the application of the 
law to the speech is just “incidental” to the law’s overall thrust. 15
Second, a different kind of “conduct, not speech” argument is 
sometimes made even to defend laws that do specifically target 
communication, such as statutes that ban the publication of bombmaking 
information. Speech, the argument runs, is punishable because it is part of 
an illegal “course of conduct,” or is perhaps “speech brigaded with 
action,”16 a “speech act” rather than pure speech.17 This is especially so 
377-78, 392 (2003) (generally endorsing “[t]he ‘speech act’ approach[, which] criminalizes 
speech because it is the act by which one either violates an independent criminal 
prohibition”—seemingly referring to prohibitions that say nothing about speech—“or 
facilitates the violation of such a prohibition”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s 
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 768 (2001) (“A person who breaks a law not directed at 
speech can claim no constitutional immunity just because he was acting for expressive 
reasons.”).  Some have also interpreted R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992), 
as taking this view, but I believe that’s a mistake, see infra note 56.
14 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969).
15 See Rodney Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and 
Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 187 (1990) (defending application of hostile 
environment law to restrict offensive workplace speech because “The gravamen of the 
tortious activity in [certain] cases . . . is arguably the proscription of underlying nonspeech 
conduct such as . . . anti-social behavior in the workplace.  The penalty exacted on speech 
in such cases appears incidental to the governmental purpose . . . .”); Elena Kagan, When a 
Speech Code Is a Speech Code, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 965 & n.24, 968 (1996) 
(seemingly suggesting that policies banning “harassment” in universities, presumably 
referring to hostile environment harassment, should only be reviewed under O’Brien, even 
when they’re applied to otherwise fully protected speech); Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So.2d
1290, 1292 (Fla. 1991) (upholding injunction ordering mother to say things “necessary to 
restore and promote the frequent and continuing positive interaction (e.g., visitation, phone 
calls, letters) between the children and their father and to refrain from doing or saying 
anything likely to defeat that end,” on the grounds that such an order was simply 
“incidental” to protecting the best interests of the child, and should therefore be reviewed 
under O’Brien); Borra v. Borra, 756 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. Super. 2000) (taking a similar 
view); Laurel S. Banks, Schutz v. Schutz, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 105, 115 (1992-93) 
(approving of the Schutz analysis).  But see In re Marriage of Olson, 850 P.2d 527, 532 
(Wash. App. 1993) (treating restrictions such as those in Schutz as content-based); David L. 
Ferguson, Comment, Schutz v. Schutz: More than a Mere “Incidental” Burden on First 
Amendment Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 937, 951 (1992) (likewise).
16 See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Press, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997) (treating 
“speech brigaded with action” as equivalent to “speech which, in its effect, is tantamount to 
legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct,” citing Giboney).
17 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING 
INFORMATION, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.html, Introduction (“[T]he 
constitutional analysis is quite different where the government punishes speech that is an 
integral part of a transaction involving conduct the government otherwise is empowered to 
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when speech seems likely to cause harms that would be punishable if 
caused by conduct rather than speech—when “words are bullets,” in the 
sense of being “a specific tool or weapon used . . . for the express purpose” 
of bringing about a harmful result.18 Such arguments often quote Giboney 
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., a 1949 case that asserted that
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and 
press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of 
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. . . .  [I]t has never been 
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of 
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or 
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.19
And Giboney has been applied to justify, among other things, restrictions on 
(1) speech that advocates crime, (2) speech that explains how crimes can be 
committed, (3) doctors’ speech recommending medicinal marijuana to their 
patients, (4) speech that urges political boycotts, (5) speech that creates an 
offensive work environment, (6) racially offensive business names, and 
even (7) public profanity. 20
Third, an influential book—Professor Kent Greenawalt’s Speech, 
Crime, and the Uses of Language (1989)—has argued that certain kinds of 
speech, such as offers, agreements, orders, permissions, and some threats 
constitute “situation-altering utterances” and should therefore be treated as 
unprotected conduct.  Finally, the “speech as conduct” argument is 
sometimes made to explain some of the uncharted zones of First 
Amendment law: categories of speech whose First Amendment status the 
Court has never squarely confronted, such as aiding and abetting, criminal 
solicitation, conspiracy, perjury, agreements to restrain trade, and 
professional advice to clients.  Most lawyers would likely agree that such 
speech should generally be unprotected or at least less protected; and a
common explanation for the Court’s lack of attention to these speech 
restrictions is that the speech is actually conduct, rather than pure speech, 
prohibit; such ‘speech acts’ . . . may be proscribed without much, if any, concern about the 
First Amendment, since it is merely incidental that such ‘conduct’ takes the form of 
speech.”).  Because the Justice Department report is far more easily accessible to readers 
on the Department Web site than it is in the limited print edition that was submitted to 
Congress, I will cite to the online version.
18 Cf. 14 LA. REV. STAT. § 390 (enacted 1962) (supporting a ban on Communist 
propaganda by arguing that “‘Words are bullets’ and the communists know it and use them 
so”; “The danger of communist propaganda lies . . . in the fact that it is a specific tool or 
weapon used by the communists for the express purpose of bringing about the forcible total 
destruction or subjugation of this state and nation . . . .”).
19 336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949).  I set aside for purposes of this Article situations 
where speech is really just used as evidence of nonspeech conduct (for instance, when a 
defendant is prosecuted for killing someone, and some of the defendant’s statements are 
used to show his motive).  See infra Part III.B.2.
20 See sources cited infra notes 120-129.
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and thus unprotected by the First Amendment.
This Article will argue that these “it’s not speech, it’s conduct”
doctrines are misguided.  The doctrines, if followed, would require courts to 
focus on the wrong questions, and would often lead courts to reach the 
wrong results (for instance, in many of the situations that I give as examples 
above).
Part II will argue that generally applicable laws can’t be upheld simply 
because they’re facially content-neutral, or even facially speech-neutral.  
Rather, when a generally applicable law is content-based as applied—when 
speech triggers the law because of the harms that may flow from what the 
speech says—it should be subject to full-fledged First Amendment scrutiny.
If someone interferes with the draft by blocking the entrance to a draft 
office, he may properly be punished under a law that bans interfering with 
the draft.  If someone interferes with the draft by publishing a book that 
persuades people to resist the draft, he may not be punished, though his 
conduct might violate the same generally applicable law.
Speech and conduct, or more precisely the speech elements of some 
behavior and its nonspeech elements, should indeed be distinguished, and 
the nonspeech elements may be much more heavily regulated.  But the 
distinction should be the one suggested by United States v. O’Brien and the 
other cases that distinguish content-neutral from content-based speech 
restrictions:  Expression can generally be regulated to prevent harms that 
flow from its noncommunicative elements (noise, traffic obstruction, and 
the like), but not harms that flow from what the expression expresses.21
Neither generally applicable laws nor specially targeted laws should be 
allowed to restrict speech because of what it says, unless the speech falls 
within one of the exceptions to protection (for instance, because it’s a threat 
or a false statement of fact) or unless the restriction passes strict scrutiny.
Moreover, this analysis cuts against some commentators’ arguments that 
First Amendment doctrine should primarily focus on smoking out 
impermissible speech-restrictive motivations on the legislature’s part.22
When the law generally applies to a wide range of conduct, and sweeps in 
speech together with such conduct, there’s little reason to think that 
lawmakers had any motivation with regard to speech, much less an 
impermissible one.  And yet, as I argue, such a law should still be 
unconstitutional when it’s applied to speech based on its content—even 
though the legislature’s motivations may have been quite benign.23
21 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969).
22 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Rubenfeld, supra 
note 13.
23 See infra Part II.E.1.
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Part III will argue that the Giboney doctrine, whether framed as 
applying to “speech acts,” to speech “brigaded with action,” or to speech 
that carries out an illegal “course of conduct,” is indeterminate, dangerous, 
and inconsistent with more recent cases.  Giboney and the cases that cite it 
don’t explain which speech should be punishable and which should not.  
The Giboney doctrine has been used to support the punishment of speech 
that under current law is rightly protected.  And even when the Giboney
argument has been used to support restricting speech that should indeed be 
restrictable, it still hasn’t adequately explained where the First Amendment 
boundaries should be drawn.
Part IV will make two observations about the “situation-altering 
uttera nces” argument.  First, the category that Professor Greenawalt 
proposes is narrower than its name might suggest.  Many utterances that in 
many senses alter the situation would remain presumptively protected 
speech even under his analysis.  That includes the speech in nearly all the 
examples given above.  The “situation-altering utterances” argument is by 
its own terms inapplicable there.
Second, it seems to me that the key insight underlying the argument—
that utterances lose their protection when they alter the speaker’s, the 
listener’s, or some third party’s perceived moral obligations—is not quite 
persuasive.  As I’ll argue in Part IV.B, it’s not clear why such an effect 
should change the First Amendment status of speech; I’ll point to some 
examples of speech that likewise alters people’s felt moral obligations but 
that seems to be pure speech, rather than conduct.  I think Speech, Crime, 
and the Uses of Language is right to conclude that agreements, offers, and 
other categories of speech should be unprotected.  The reason for this, 
though, doesn’t seem to be simply that such statements are “situation-
altering.”
All this, though, leaves several First Amendment puzzles. Just why are 
criminal agreements, criminal solicitation, and most verbal aiding and 
abetting punishable, even when they are accomplished solely through 
words?  Why can some speech be restricted under antitrust law or securities 
law?  Part V will argue that these puzzles should be solved the same way 
the Court has explained why incitement, libel, fraud, threats, and other 
speech are punishable:  By recognizing that these speech restrictions are 
indeed speech restrictions, and by delineating the proper constitutional 
boundaries of these restrictions.
This delineation would require a considerable amount of work, and this 
Article will only sketch the outlines of this task.  But embracing this task is 
better—and more likely to lead to right results—than avoiding it through 
simply labeling speech “conduct,” with no explanation for why certain 
forms of communication are protected and certain others are not.
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II. LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
A. Content-Based as Applied vs. Content-Neutral as Applied
Let’s say that a generally applicable law is applied to speech, though on 
its face the law doesn’t mention speech.  Sometimes, as in United States v. 
O’Brien, the law may be triggered by the “noncommunicative impact of 
[the speech], and [by] nothing else.”24  A law barring noise louder than 90
decibels, for instance, might apply to the use of bullhorns in a 
demonstration.  We might call such a generally applicable law “content-
neutral as applied,” because it applies to speech without regard to its 
content.
But sometimes the law may be triggered by what the speech 
communicates.  The law may, for instance, prohibit any conduct that is 
likely to have a certain effect, and the effect may sometimes be caused by 
the content of speech:  A law prohibiting aiding and abetting crime, for 
example, might in some circumstances be violated by a person’s publishing 
a book that describes how a crime can be easily committed.25
We might call this law “content-based as applied,” because its 
application is triggered by the content of the speech.  The law doesn’t just 
have the effect of restricting some speech more than other speech—most 
content-neutral laws do that.26  Rather, the law applies to speech precisely 
because of the harms that supposedly flow from the content:  Publishing 
and distributing the book violates the aiding and abetting law because of 
24 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969) (holding that a 
generally applicable law banning destruction of draft cards should be judged under a 
relatively forgiving First Amendment standard, rather than strict scrutiny, because it 
applied to the defendant “[f]or [the] noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for 
nothing else”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First 
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 38, 45 (1973) (similarly distinguishing laws that restrict 
speech because of a government “non-speech interest,” which turns on the 
noncommunicative impact of the speech, from laws that restrict expression because of a 
government “anti-speech interest,” which turns on the harms “caused by the meaning effect 
of the speech”).
25 See, e.g., IND. STAT. § 35-41-2-4 (“A person who knowingly or intentionally aids . . 
. another person to commit an offense commits that offense”); Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 
128 F.3d 233, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1997) (arguing that publishing a book that intentionally 
explains how to commit a crime may constitute aiding and abetting of the crime); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying notes 55-60 (taking the same view 
as Rice).  See generally Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at ___.
26
 For instance, my sense is that bans on residential picketing in the late 1980s 
probably disproportionately affected speech criticizing abortion providers, since the pro-
life movement seems to have used residential picketing more than many other political 
movements did.
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what the book says.
The rest of this Part will argue that laws that are content-based as 
applied should be presumptively unconstitutional, just as facially content-
based laws are presumptively unconstitutional.  Both presumptions may 
sometimes be rebutted, for instance if the speech falls within an exception 
to protection,27 or if the speech restriction passes strict scrutiny.28  But 
generally speaking, when a law punishes speech because its content may 
cause harmful effects, that law should be treated as content-based.
B. Supreme Court Cases
The Court, it turns out, has actually confronted many cases where a law 
was content-based as applied.  In all those cases, either the Court held that 
the speech was constitutionally protected—or, if it held otherwise, the 
decision is now viewed as obsolete.
Consider, for instance, the World War I-era cases Debs v. United States,
Frohwerk v. United States, and Schenck v. United States.29 These cases, 
which upheld the criminal punishment of antiwar speech, are now generally 
seen as having been wrongly decided.30 But the convictions involved the 
violation of a generally applicable provision of the Espionage Act, which 
barred all conduct—speech or not—that “willfully obstruct[ed] the 
recruitment or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the 
service or the United States.”31
The Act could have been constitutionally applied to burning a recruiting 
27 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
28 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending 
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418-24 (1997).
29
 249 U.S. 211 (1919); 249 U.S. 204 (1919); 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
30 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS 
966 (2d ed. 2002); Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of 
Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 569 (2000); Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing 
The Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1175, 1218-19 (2000).
31
 Espionage Act of 1917, sec. 3, 65th Cong., sess. I, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217-31.  See also
Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1949) (upholding conviction for 
“knowingly counsel[ing], aid[ing], or abet[ting]” draft evasion, partly on the grounds that 
“violation of [the law], particularly as to aiding and abetting, might be consummated 
without any expression of opinion,” and that the First Amendment provides no protection 
just because “the acts of violation are consummated, as counseling always must be, through 
the medium of words”), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 857 (1949).
Debs and Frohwerk involved prosecutions solely under the generally applicable 
provision of the Act.  Schenck was also convicted on two counts of unlawfully mailing 
certain material; those counts did not involve generally applicable provisions.  I suspect, 
though, that most critics of the Schenck are at least as concerned about the generally 
applicable Espionage Act, which had the effect of outlawing anti-draft speech generally, as 
about the provisions that were limited to distributing anti-draft speech through the mails.
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office (nonspeech conduct), or perhaps to disrupting the business of a 
recruiting office by using bullhorns outside the office windows (speech 
punished because of its noncommunicative impact).32 But under modern 
First Amendment law, convictions for antiwar leafleting or speeches would 
be overturned, and the law treated as content-based,33 because such antiwar 
speech interferes with the draft precisely because of its content.34
More broadly, if generally applicable laws were immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny, then the government could suppress much speech that 
is now constitutionally protected—advocacy of illegal conduct, praise of 
illegal conduct, or even advocacy of legal conduct.  A generally applicable 
ban on “assisting, directly or indirectly, conspiracies to overthrow the 
government” could prohibit advocacy of overthrow alongside physical 
conduct such as making bombs:  Advocacy of overthrow assists such 
overthrow, by persuading people to join or at least not oppose the 
revolutionary movement.  A ban on “assisting interference with the 
provision of abortion services” could ban speech that praises or defends 
anti-abortion blockaders or vandals, and not just actual blockading or 
vandalism.
A ban on “conduct that knowingly or recklessly aids the enemy in time 
of war” could, among other things, ban speech that helps the election of an 
anti-war candidate.35 Such speech could even be banned by the existing law 
32 Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (plurality) (holding that the 
government may to some extent restrict sound amplification); id. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing on this point); id. (Jackson, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (likewise).  Cf. L.A. Powe, Jr., Searching for the False Shout of “Fire”, 19 
CONST. COMM. 345, 347 (2002) (concluding that Justice Holmes reached the result in 
Schenck precisely because he saw it as involving a generally applicable criminal law, rather 
than a speech restriction; “The distinction between an attempt by conduct and an attempt 
by speech was, for Holmes, a distinction without a difference.”).
33 See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (citing Schenck as an example 
of a case that involved a content-based distinction); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 
745 (1978) (plurality) (likewise).
34 See Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The 
Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 611, 645-46 (1992) (likewise 
noting that many of the cases mentioned in the text involved a generally applicable law, but 
that the speech should nonetheless have been protected against those laws); Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 198-
99 (1983) (characterizing the law in Schenck as a “content-based restriction” “which 
prohibited expression critical of the war and the draft,” though the portion of the Act that 
generally prohibited expression critical of the war and the draft—as opposed to merely 
false information about the war—was generally applicable to conduct as well as speech).
35 See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict 
Scrutiny, supra note 28, at 2425-31 (describing this hypothetical); cf. Letter from Abraham 
Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES 
AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 454 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed. 1989) (arguing that such anti-
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of treason, which bars intentionally aiding the enemy during wartime, if a 
prosecutor can persuade the jury that the speaker was motivated by a desire 
to help the other side.36 A ban on “conduct that interferes with the 
enforcement of judicial decrees” may be applied to speech that criticizes 
judges or judicial actions, on the theory that such criticism may lead people 
to lose respect for courts, and thus to disobey court orders.37
All the speech in these examples may help bring about the harms that 
the government is trying to prevent using a generally applicable law.  It may 
even involve “words that may have all the effect of force,” an example that 
Schenck gave as quintessentially unprotected speech (citing Gompers v. 
Buck’s Stove & Range Co., which upheld an injunction against newspaper 
articles that urged a labor boycott):38 The speech may have an effect that 
would be eminently punishable if it were brought about by force rather than 
communication.  But the premise of the retreat from Schenck, and of the 
adoption of the Brandenburg v. Ohio rule, is that the government must 
generally tolerate such advocacy even when the persuasiveness or the 
informational content of the speech can lead to eventual harm.39
Similarly, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,40 where the Court 
war speech may be punishable, though focusing more on the speech as advocacy of 
desertion rather than treason as such); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE
PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE” 300-18 (2000) (discussing the Vallandigham incident); 
Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7 
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 105, 121-22, 161 (1998) (likewise).
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (defining treason as including a citizen’s “adher[ing] to [the 
United States’] enemies, giving them aid and comfort”); Kawakita v. United States, 343 
U.S. 717, 736, 742-44 (1952) (holding that “adhering” simply requires an intention to help 
the enemy).
37 See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (striking down a contempt of court 
citation in such a case); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (same); Wood v. 
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (same).  These cases involved the common-law crime of 
contempt of court; contempt was sometimes defined quite generally as “disregard of the 
authority of the court” (a definition that would cover a wide variety of conduct, such as 
violation of a court order, as well as speech), and sometimes more specifically as covering 
a long list of behavior including “Dissemination of contemptuous publications.”  See 
EDWARD M. DANGEL, NATIONAL LAWYERS’ MANUAL—CONTEMPT § 2 (1939).  But as the 
example in the text shows, the same results could have been reached under a generally 
applicable contempt rule.  See also Brenner, supra note 13, at 321 -22 (treating contempt of 
court law as a generally applicable rule, though acknowledging that “when criminal 
contempt is based on the communicative content of speech, it is an attempt to control 
speech that implicates the guarantees of the First Amendment”).
38
 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citing 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911)).
39 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 848 n.56 (2d ed. 1987) 
(“Moreover, however a law is written, it may not constitutionally be applied to punish 
speech on content-related grounds where nothing beyond abstract advocacy is shown, and 
where incitement is thus absent.”).
40
 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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held that speech constituting tortious interference with business relations 
may nonetheless be constitutionally protected.  This tort covers a variety of 
conduct, not just speech.41  But when the interference flows from the 
persuasive or informative effect of speech—for instance, when the speech 
in Claiborne persuaded people to boycott a business, publicized the name of 
people who weren’t complying with the boycott, or persuaded others to 
ostracize people who refused to join the boycott—the tort is treated as a 
speech restriction.
In some situations, the tort may be a constitutionally permissible 
restriction, for instance when the speech is a constitutionally unprotected 
threat, incitement, or the like.42  But if the speech falls outside an exception 
to protection, and if it causes harm through its content, then the First 
Amendment protects the speech against the generally applicable tort just as 
much as it protects the speech against facially content-based laws.
The same is true, in considerable measure, for antitrust laws or more 
broadly laws that prohibit restraint of trade.  Such laws are also generally 
applicable, and are generally used to punish conduct, not speech.  But when 
organizations help restrain trade by lobbying legislatures and the public for 
anticompetitive regulations, Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motors
and United Mine Workers v. Pennington hold that the speech may not be 
punished.43
41 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766B cmt. b, 767 cmt. c (citing 
Tarleton v. McGawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793), a case imposing liability for 
physically attacking trading partners, as the ancestor of this tort); see, e.g., Lucas v. 
Monroe County, 203 F.3d 964, 969 (6th Cir. 2000) (allowing cause of action based on 
discriminatory refusal by a county government to deal with a contractor); H.J., Inc. v. 
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1548 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing cause of 
action based on defendants’ selling product below cost in order to monopolize a market).
42 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982); Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).  Claiborne Hardware may be criticized on 
the grounds that some of the speech there was indeed threatening, especially against the 
backdrop of violence related to the boycott.  But the Court concluded that the speech was 
indeed not an unprotected threat or unprotected incitement; and given this, the Court’s 
further holding—which is that such presumptively protected speech couldn’t be made the 
subject of an interference with business relations tort—seems quite correct.
43
 365 U.S. 127 (1961); 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  Noerr and Pennington reached a speech-
protective result by interpreting the Sherman Act not to apply to anticompetitive lobbying 
or public advocacy; but it’s clear that the Court’s judgment was influenced by a desire to 
avoid a First Amendment violation.  See, e.g., Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138; FTC v. Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990).  See also David McGowan & Mark 
A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First 
Amendment, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 363-66 (1994) (arguing that Noerr/Pen-
nington immunity makes sense only as a First Amendment exception to antitrust law, and 
not as a faithful interpretation of antitrust law standing alone).
These cases involved civil lawsuits, but surely speech should be at least as protected 
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This principle also applies when the speech causes harm because of its 
offensive content rather than its persuasive or informative content.  
Consider Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, which held that the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress couldn’t be used to punish a cruel 
and vulgar Hustler satire of Jerr y Falwell.44  Though claims under the 
emotional distress tort are often based on speech, speech is not an element 
of the tort.  The publisher of Hustler, for instance, would have been equally 
guilty of intentional infliction of emotional distress if he had played a 
highly embarrassing practical joke on Falwell. 45 But when the general law 
was applied to the magazine because of the content of its speech, the Court 
held such liability to be unconstitutional.46
The same is true of Cohen v. California, where Cohen was prosecuted 
for a violation of a generally applicable breach of the peace statute.47  The 
statute would have applied equally to conduct (fighting), speech that 
breaches the peace because of its noncommunicative impact (loud speech in 
the middle of the night), and speech that breaches the peace because of its 
content (wearing a “Fuck the Draft” jacket).  But the Court struck down the 
application of the law in this last situation, precisely because the law 
covered Cohen because of what he said.
Likewise, Hess v. Indiana,48 Ter miniello v. City of Chicago,49 Cantwell 
against criminal punishments as it is against civil suits.
44
 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
45 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, ill. 3 (“A is invited to a 
swimming party at an exclusive resort. B gives her a bathing suit which he knows will 
dissolve in water. It does dissolve while she is swimming, leaving her naked in the 
presence of men and women whom she has just met. A suffers extreme embarrassment, 
shame, and humiliation. B is subject to liability to A for her emotional distress.”).
46
 The Hustler decision relied on the speech being on matters of publi c concern and 
about a public figure; the Court might yet recognize a free speech exception for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress where private figures or statements on matters of private 
concern are involved.  But this would happen because that speech is seen as harmful and 
not valuable enough to be protected, not because the tort is a law of general applicability 
(since the tort’s general applicability wasn’t enough to save it in Hustler).
47
 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (involving a statute that, in relevant part, barred people from 
“maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . 
. by tumultuous or offensive conduct”).
48
 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (involving a statute barring people from “act[ing] in a loud, 
boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or 
family, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening, 
traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting”).
49
 337 U.S. 1, 2 n.1 (1949) (involving a statute barring people from “making any 
improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of 
the peace,” with “breach of the peace” defined in a jury instruction as “misbehavior which 
violates the public peace and decorum” or “stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings 
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or . . . molests the inhabitants in the 
enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm”).  See also Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
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v. Connecticut,50 and Edwards v. South Carolina51 all set aside breach of the 
peace and disorderly conduct convictions, though the statutes involved were 
content-based only as applied, not on their face.  As the Court pointed out in 
Cantwell, “breach of the peace” legitimately “embraces a great variety of 
conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility,” including 
“violent acts”; but the First Amendment may be violated when conduct 
amounts to a breach of the peace due only to “the effect of [the speaker‘s] 
communication upon his hearers.”52
So all the laws in these examples were facially speech-neutral.  Most, 
and probably all, were enacted by legislatures or created by courts without 
any censorious motive, partly because their creators were trying to punish 
and prevent harm, not speech as such.  Yet these cases—or, as to the 
Espionage Act cases, the modern repudiation of those cases53—treat the 
application of these laws based on the content of speech just as skeptically 
as the Court has treated facially content-based restrictions.54  Likewise, later 
decisions treat Cantwell, Cohen, Edwards, and Terminiello as involving 
content-based speech restrictions.55
315 (1951), which involved a statute stating that “Any person who with intent to provoke a 
breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned” “[u]ses 
offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or behavior,” 
“[a]cts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to 
others,” or “[c]ongregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on when 
ordered by the police,” “shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly 
conduct.”  The conviction in Feiner was upheld, but only on the grounds that the speech 
was unprotected by the First Amendment because it posed a “clear and present danger of . . 
. immediate threat to public safety.”
50
 310 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1940).
51
 372 U.S. 229, 235-37 (1963) (involving a statute barring “disturbance of the public 
tranquility[] by any act or conduct inciting to violence,” but concluding that speech that 
disturbs the public tranquility because “the opinions which [the speakers] were peaceably 
expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the community to 
attract a crowd and necessitate police protection” is constitutionally protected even if it’s 
covered by such a breach of the peace statute).
52
 310 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1940).
53 See supra note 30.
54 See Blasi, supra note 34, at 646 (noting this); David Bogen, Generally Applicable 
Laws and the First Amendment, 26 SW. U. L. REV. 201, 222-23 (1997) (likewise 
distinguishing generally applicable laws that are applied to speech for reasons unrelated to 
its content from generally applicable laws that are applied to speech precisely because of its 
content).
55 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (“Where 
the designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of 
listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less 
restrictive alternative exists. We are expected to protect our own sensibilities ‘simply by 
averting [our] eyes.’ Cohen v. California.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 
(1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, 
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I will argue below that the Court has indeed been right to condemn 
restrictions that are content-based as applied.  But for now, these cases 
should at least show that any broad First Amendment immunity for 
generally applicable laws would be incompatible with many leading 
precedents.56  The laws described in Part I should be treated as involving 
content-based speech restrictions.  They shouldn’t evade serious First 
Amendment scrutiny on the grounds that they are generally applicable.
C. The Press Cases
So far, I’ve used the term “generally applicable law” simply to mean “a 
law applicable equally to a wide variety of conduct, whether speech or not.”  
But “generally applicable law” can mean several different things, depending 
on context:
(1) a facially speech-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable to a 
wide variety of conduct, whether speech or not;
(2) a facially religion-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable 
equally to religious observers and to others; or
(3) a facially press-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable equally 
to the press and to others.
see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. 
Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”); Forsyth County v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-
neutral basis for regulation. Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can 
be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob. See . . . Terminiello 
v. Chicago.”); Young v. American Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 64 (1976) (plurality) (quoting 
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But, above all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.  Cohen v. California; . . . Terminiello v. 
Chicago.”)); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 586 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that under 
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the 
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers. See, e.g., . . . Edwards v. South 
Carolina; Terminiello v. City of Chicago; cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut.”).
56
 A few courts and commentators have cited R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
389 (1992), for the proposition that there’s no First Amendment problem when speech is
subjected, based on its content, to generally applicable laws.  See, e.g., supra note 13
(citing Burns v. City of Detroit, the Avis v. Aguilar plurality, and the Dep’t of Corrections 
v. State Personnel Bd. dissent).  But R.A.V. dealt only with whether the government may 
discriminate based on content among speech that falls within the existing First Amendment 
exceptions, such as fighting words.  The Court specifically said only that “a particular 
content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally 
within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech,” 505 U.S. at 389 
(emphasis added); and its logic is indeed limited to restrictions on speech that fits within 
one of the exceptions, see Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace 
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1829-32 (1992) (discussing this in some detail); 
Saxe v. State College Area School Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 207-08 (3rd Cir. 2001) (likewise).
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These three meanings—facially speech-neutral, facially religion-neutral, 
and facially press-neutral—are different, though they sometimes share the 
same label “generally applicable law.”  For instance, libel law principles are 
generally press-neutral but not speech-neutral.  A tax on all books is 
religion-neutral but not press-neutral.
Unfortunately, since all these laws are sometimes called “generally 
applicable,” these definitions can get confused for one another.  One major 
argument against the position I defend in the previous section flows from 
this very sort of confusion. That argument cites Cohen v. Cowles Media,57
and the opinions on which that opinion relies, for the proposition that 
applying generally applicable laws to speech doesn’t violate the First 
Amendment.58
In Cohen v. Cowles Media, the Court did hold that “generally applicable 
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement 
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the 
news,” and cited several other cases that so held.59  But this only means that 
press-neutral laws are constitutional.  The Court did not say that speech-
neutral laws, especially ones that are content-based as applied, are 
inherently constitutional.
Cohen v. Cowles Media involved a promissory estoppel lawsuit by a 
source against a newspaper publisher.  Cowles breached its promise not to 
reveal Cohen’s name; Cohen sued for this breach and won, and the Court 
held that the damages award didn’t violate the First Amendment.  In the 
process, the Court reasoned that the case was controlled by the
well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do 
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the 
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. As the 
cases relied on by respondents recognize, the truthful information sought to be 
published must have been lawfully acquired. The press may not with 
impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news. Neither does 
the First Amendment relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation shared by 
all citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant 
to a criminal investigation, even though the reporter might be required to 
reveal a confidential source. The press, like others interested in publishing, 
may not publish copyrighted material without obeying the copyright laws. 
Similarly, the media must obey the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling; may not 
restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws; and must pay 
nondiscriminatory taxes.  It is therefore beyond dispute that “[t]he publisher of 
a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. 
57
 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
58 See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Press, 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); Bogen, supra
note 54, at 227; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at n.56.
59
 501 U.S. at 669.
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He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.”
Accordingly, enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject 
to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons 
or organizations.
There can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of promissory 
estoppel is a law of general applicability.  It does not target or single out the 
press. Rather, insofar as we are advised, the doctrine is generally applicable to 
the daily transactions of all the citizens of Minnesota.  The First Amendment 
does not forbid its application to the press.60
The Court repeatedly stressed that it was discussing only whether the 
press gets special exemption from laws that are equally applicable to the 
press and to others; this quote mentions “the press,” “newspapers,” or “the 
media” nine times.  Each of the examples mentions what “the press,” “the 
media,” “newspaper[s],” and “newspaper reporter[s]” have no special right 
to do.  And this makes sense, because the Court was overruling the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the First Amendment requires 
courts to “balance the constitutional rights of a free press against the 
common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity.”61
Moreover, two of the Court’s examples are consistent only with the 
interpretation that the Court used “generally applicable” to mean press-
neutral rather than speech-neutral.  First, copyright law (which the Court 
also mentions as an example later in the opinion62) is press-neutral but not
speech-neutral. In 1977, when Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting—
the case that the Court cited when mentioning copyright—was decided, 
copyright law applied exclusively to speech and other communication, as it 
had through most of its history.  Even today it applies mostly to such 
communication, though over the past few decades it has been extended to 
cover architectural works and computer program object code.63
60 Id. at 669-70 (citations omitted).
61
 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990) (emphasis added).
62 See 501 U.S. at 671 (“The dissenting opinions suggest that the press should not be 
subject to any law, including copyright law for example, which in any fashion or to any 
degree limits or restricts the press’ right to report truthful information.  The First 
Amendment does not grant the press such limitless protection.”).
63 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853, sec. 4 (1988) (amending Copyright Act to cover architectural works); Pub. L. 96-
517, 94 Stat. 3015, sec. 10 (1980) (amending Copyright Act to mention computer 
programs).  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at n.56, argues that Cohen v. Cowles 
Media and Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), stand for 
the proposition “that generally applicable common-law causes of action typically will not 
offend the First Amendment in cases where they are applied to expressive conduct such as 
publication or broadcast,” unless “an element of that cause of action inevitably (or almost 
always) depends on the communicative impact of speech or expression.”  This assertion, 
though, ignores the fact that Zacchini itself involved the right of publicity, a tort that 
invariably involves “expressive conduct such as publication or broadcast”; and it doesn’t 
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Second, as Part II.B pointed out, the First Amendment sometimes does 
provide a defense against antitrust law, when the alleged restraint of trade 
comes from a defendant’s speech that advocates legislation.  Citizen 
Publishing Co. v. United States and Associated Press v. United States, the 
two antitrust cases that the Court cited, hold that newspapers can’t raise 
their status as members of the press as a defense to antitrust law.  But Noerr
and Pennington make clear that speakers can raise as a defense the fact that 
the law is being applied to them because of their speech.64
So the Court’s “general applicability” reasoning that I quote above 
means simply that the law was press-neutral, and thus not subject to any 
heightened scrutiny because it was applied to the press.65  That, of course, 
left the argument that the law did restrict speech:  After all, it was Cowles 
Media’s speech that constituted the potentially actionable breaking of a 
promise.
But later in the opinion, the Court does explain why promissory 
estoppel law is indeed constitutionally applicable to all speakers, whether 
press or not:  “Minnesota law,” the Court holds, “simply requires those 
making promises to keep them.  The parties themselves, as in this case, 
determine the scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions which 
may be placed on the publication of truthful information are self-
imposed.”66 The free speech argument was rejected based on the principle 
that free speech rights, like most other rights, can be waived.67  It wasn’t 
rejected based on an assertion that speech-neutral laws are per se 
constitutional.
D. The Religion Cases
A second argument in favor of the categorical constitutionality of 
mention NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, in which a generally applicable common-law 
cause of action was seen as offending the First Amendment when applied to expressive 
conduct.
64
 365 U.S. 127 (1961); 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
65 Cf. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (“But while the 
enforcement of a generally applicable law may or may not be subject to heightened 
scrutiny under the First Amendment, compare Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. with Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-567 (1991), laws that single out the press, or certain 
elements thereof, for special treatment ‘pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,’ and 
so are always subject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”) 
(some internal citations omitted).
66
 501 U.S. at 671.
67
 This reasoning made it unnecessary for the majority to decide whether promissory 
estoppel law was purely content-neutral or facially content-neutral but content-based as 
applied—the Court’s argument, which is that free speech rights may be waived, would 
apply in either event.
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speech-neutral laws might operate by the analogy to religion-neutral laws.  
Employment Division v. Smith,68 the argument would go, has held that 
generally applicable laws (in the “religion-neutral” sense) don’t violate the 
Free Exercise Clause; likewise, generally applicable laws (in the “speech-
neutral” sense) shouldn’t be seen as violating the Free Speech Clause.69
This analogy, I think, is weak.  The Free Exercise Clause and the Free 
Speech Clause protect different private interests and have long been 
interpreted differently.70 The Free Exercise Clause, for instance, doesn’t 
generally entitle people to inflict emotional distress on a public figure, 
interfere with business relations, engage in anticompetitive conduct, breach 
the peace, or interfere with the draft, even if the people feel religiously 
compelled to do so.  It probably wouldn’t have entitled people to do so even 
in the decades between Sherbert v. Verner and Employment Division v. 
Smith,71 when the Free Exercise Clause ostensibly provided religious 
objectors with some exemptions from generally applicable laws.72  The Free 
Speech Clause does let one do these things, if they’re done through the 
communicative effect of one’s speech.
But to the extent that the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech 
Clause are indeed analogous, the analogy actually cuts in favor of my 
argument.  With the Religion Clauses, too, some laws that are religion-
neutral on their face may still be unconstitutionally religion-based as 
applied.
Consider, for instance, the law of intra-church disputes.  Generally 
applicable, religion-neutral laws, such as contract law, property law, and 
wills and trusts law may generally be applied to resolve such disputes, with 
68
 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
69
 Many commentators have noted the similarity between Cohen v. Cowles Media and 
Employment Division v. Smith, though without taking the next step to argue that all facially 
speech-neutral restrictions are per se constitutional by analogy to Smith (a step that I have 
heard some people make in person, though not in print).  See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, 
Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 650-51 
(2001); Kristian D. Whitten, The Economics of Actual Malice, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 519, 570 
(2001-02).  Justice Scalia in Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), does argue that facially speech-neutral rules are per 
se constitutional, by analogy to Smith, but the law involved in Barnes was not just 
generally applicable but also content-neutral as applied (at least in Justice Scalia’s view, 
see id. at 574 n.2).  Justice Scalia’s statement that “if the law is not directed against the 
protected value (religion or expression) the law must be obeyed,” id., doesn’t indicate how 
he would treat a law that’s generally applicable (and thus not directed against expression on 
its face) but content-based, and thus directed against the content of expression, as applied.
70 See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 1465, 1498-1501 (1999).
71 374 U.S. 398 (1963); 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
72 See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460 (1971) (rejecting a claim that 
the Free Exercise Clause mandates a religious exemption from the draft).
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no First Amendment problems.  If I leave property to a church so long as 
the church doesn’t use the property for manufacturing purposes, such a 
condition can be enforced.73  But when the generally applicable will 
interpretation rules would, as applied, require courts to make religious 
judgments—for instance, if I leave property to a church so long as it 
remains religiously orthodox and my heirs try to reclaim the property on the 
grounds that the church has violated the condition—the Religion Clauses 
prohibit courts from acting.74
Likewise, the law of fraud and false advertising is facially religion-
neutral, and may often be applicable to churches’ nonreligious claims.  But 
if the law as applied to a claim would require courts to evaluate the truth or 
falsehood of a religious assertion, the Religion Clauses would prohibit such 
an application.75
The same is likely true in other situations as well.  Consider, for 
instance, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  If you inflict 
emotional distress on a pro-choice politician by using loudspeakers outside 
his house at 3 a.m., you will have no Free Speech Clause defense.76
Likewise, even if you feel religiously compelled to remonstrate with the 
politician this way, you will likely have no Free Exercise Clause defense.77
But if you inflict emotional distress on him using the content of speech, 
for instance by publishing a vitriolic satire, that’s constitutionally protected 
under the Free Speech Clause.78  Likewise, if a church inflicts emotional 
distress on him by excommunicating him, that’s constitutionally protected 
under the Free Exercise Clause. 79  Even if the excommunication causes 
73 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979) (concluding that civil courts may decide 
church property disputes using “neutral principles” to interpret trust documents).
74 Id. at 602-04 (stressing that the “neutral principles” approach was permissible only 
to the extent that a court can avoid “rely[ing] on religious precepts” and resolving 
controversies related to “religious concepts” in the trust documents); Arkansas Presbytery 
of Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Ark. 2001) (“Any 
documents, such as the church constitution, pertinent to the dispute, must be scrutinized in 
purely secular terms.”).
75 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
76 See supra note 32.
77 See Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (holding, even during the 
Sherbert/Yoder era, when strict scrutiny was generally applied to religious exemption 
claims, that religious observers’ rights to engage in religiously motivated speech are no 
greater than secular speakers’ rights to engage in analogous secular speech).
78
 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
79 Cf., e.g., Marks v. Estate of Hartgerink, 528 N.W.2d 539, 544-45 (Iowa 1995) 
(refusing to recognize a tort of wrongful excommunication); Korean Presbyterian Church 
v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565, 569-70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Murphy v. I.S.K.CON. of 
New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 346 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim when the distress was caused by allegedly harmful religious 
teachings; “Inherent in the claim that exposure to ISKCON N.E.’s religious beliefs causes 
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severe emotional distress—as it may, especially if the politician or his 
family believes that it will damn him to hell—and even if a jury finds that 
the excommunication was outrageous, the excommunication is 
constitutionally protected.
Emotional distress that flows from the religiosity of the offensive 
conduct, like emotional distress that flows from the content of people’s 
speech, thus may not form the basis of legal liability even under the 
generally applicable emotional distress tort. Similarly, many child custody 
cases have held that the facially religion-neutral “best interests of the child” 
standard may sometimes violate the Free Exercise Clause:  Courts may not 
diminish the custody rights of a divorced parent because of the supposed 
harmfulness of the religious doctrine that he’s teaching his children, unless 
there’s serious evidence that the teaching is not just against the child’s “best 
interests” but is actually likely to cause significant harm to the child.80
Again, I don’t want to claim too much of an analogy here:  Some of the 
cases cited above rely on the Free Exercise Clause,81 but others just talk 
about the First Amendment generally;82 and the reasons for some of these 
tortious emotional damages is the notion that the disputed beliefs are fundamentally flawed 
and inconsistent with a proper notion of human development.  While this issue may be the 
subject of a theological or academic debate, it has no place in the courts of this 
Commonwealth.”).
80 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Minix, 801 N.E.2d 1201, 1203, 1205 (Ill. App. 2003); In 
re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 899 P.2d 803, 808 (Wash. App. 1995); Pater v. Pater, 588 
N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ohio 1992); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990); In re Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 282-83 (Tex. App. 1987).  But see In 
re Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985) (concluding that courts applying the “best 
interests of the child” standard can take into consideration the parents’ religious practices, 
though acknowledging that even there “[c]ourts are precluded by the free exercise of 
religion clause from weighing the comparative merits of the religious tenets of the various 
faiths or basing its custody decisions solely on religious considerations”); LeDoux v. 
LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990) (concluding that “The paramount consideration in 
all cases involving the custody or visitation of a child is the best interests of the child,” and 
that the parents’ religious practices may be considered when determining what is in the 
child’s best interests); Rogers v. Rogers, 490 So.2d 1017, 1018-19 (Fla. App. 1986) 
(likewise).
81 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North 
America, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952) (holding that interference with internal church affairs 
violates “the free exercise of religion”); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448 (1969) (citing Kedroff for the same 
proposition); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (relying on the “freedom 
of religious belief”).
82 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (just talking about the First 
Amendment); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (talking 
about both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause); In re Marriage of 
Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 277-78 (Tex. App. 1987) (likewise); see also Waites v. Waites, 
567 S.W.2d 326, 331 n.2 (Mo. 1978) (reaching a similar result solely under the 
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doctrines have more to do with fear of government entanglement with 
theological questions than with concern about equal treatment as such.83  As 
I mentioned, there’s no reason to expect Free Speech Clause doctrine to 
track Religion Clauses doctrine perfectly.
Nonetheless, the Religion Clauses jurisprudence generally illustrates my 
broader point:  When constitutional doctrine prohibits laws that facially turn 
on some factor—whether the factor is the content of speech or religious 
judgments—the doctrine should also bar courts from considering the same 
factor when applying generally applicable laws.84
E. Free Speech and the Constitutional Immunity for Persuasion,
Information, and Content-Based Offensiveness
1. The limited relevance of good government motives
The cases discussed in Part II.B reflect, I think, a coherent principle:  
The First Amendment generally makes conveying facts and opinions into a 
constitutionally immunized activity.  Normally, the government may punish 
people for causing various harms, directly or indirectly.  But it generally 
may not punish speakers when the harms are caused by what the speaker is 
saying—by the persuasive, informative, or offensive force of the facts or 
opinions that the speaker expressed.85
This is of course quite compatible with the Court’s general 
jurisprudence of content-based restrictions; it just equally covers laws that 
are content-based as applied and laws that are content-based on their face.
And this principle makes sense:  As we see from the cases, a law that’s 
content-based as applied (such as the Espionage Act involved in Schenck
and Debs) can restrict speech as much as a law that’s content-based on its 
face.  Moreover, such a law is indeed punishing the “speech element” of the 
communication rather than some “nonspeech element.”86
Establishment Clause); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1241 (Alaska 1979) (likewise).
83 See, e.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
84
 We see something similar even in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.  Generally 
applicable race-neutral laws are usually constitutional—but not when they’re race-based as 
applied.  Consider Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), where the Court held 
unconstitutional a child custody decision based on the mother’s having remarried someone 
of another race:  A best interests of the child standard is facially race-neutral, and usually 
quite permissible; but when the harm to the child’s interests is said to flow from the 
parent’s race, the Court recognizes that the application of the law involves race 
discrimination.  
85
 Of course, unless the speech falls within the usual First Amendment exceptions, 
such as incitement, false statements of fact, threats, and the like.
86 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
24 VOLOKH [rough draft
The principle is in some tension, however, with the theory that the First 
Amendment is chiefly aimed at preventing government actions that are 
motivated by a desire to suppress speech.87  In the examples I gave above, 
the lawmakers may have genuinely wanted to prevent a certain kind of 
harm, and may have been quite indifferent to whether that harm is caused 
by speech or by conduct.  The drafters of the Espionage Act, for instance, 
might have sincerely wanted to punish all interference with military 
recruitment, whether through conduct or speech.  But whether the Act was 
well-motivated or not, it should have generally been unconstitutional when 
applied to interference by persuasion.
In some of the examples I give above, one can argue that the law is open 
to improper government motivations in its enforcement.  For instance, the 
“outrageousness” test in the emotional distress tort, the “offensive 
behavior” test in breach of the peace laws, and the “offensive work 
environment” test in workplace harassment law are quite vague.  
Prosecutors, judges, and juries might well interpret them narrowly when 
they agree with the speech, and broadly when they disagree with the speech.
But in other situations, the law is pretty clear.  Public speech that 
advocates draft resistance does seem likely to willfully obstruct 
recruitment.88  A journal article that explains how fingerprint recognition 
systems can be evaded89 does seem likely to facilitate certain crimes by 
some readers.  If applying the law to some such speech would violate the 
First Amendment, the reason must flow from something other than the 
87 See, e.g., Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose, supra note 22, at 413 (“First 
Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as 
its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”); 
Kagan, When a Speech Code Is a Speech Code, supra note 15, at 965 & n.24, 968 
(applying this approach to suggest that generally applicable policies banning hostile 
environment harassment in universities should only be reviewed under O’Brien, even when 
they’re applied to otherwise fully protected speech); Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 784 
(arguing that the Free Speech Clause is implicated “if and only if: (1) the law makes the 
fact that [a person] was communicating an element of the prohibited offense; (2) the 
legislative purpose was to target speech even though the prohibition is speech-neutral on its 
face; or (3) the law was selectively enforced to target speech”).  I say only “in some tension 
with” because some of the scholars who urge a focus on motive acknowledge that “[s]ome 
aspects of First Amendment law resist explanation in terms of motive,” Kagan, Private 
Speech, Public Purpose, supra note 22, at 415.  Since Professor Kagan’s claim is only that 
“the concern with governmental motive [is] . . . the most important[] explanatory factor in 
First Amendment law,” id. at 416, and “most important” is necessarily a subjective factor, I 
leave it to the reader to decide whether the cases discussed above substantially undermine 
that claim.
88 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);     
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539-40 (D.D.C. 1917) (Learned Hand, J.).
89 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at ___ n.___ (discussing such 
an article).
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government’s motive, which may well be quite pure.90 So if the cases in 
Part II.B are right, the constitutional problem lies in the law’s being 
content-based as applied—in its punishing speech because of the persuasive 
effect of the speech—and not in the government’s being motivated by a 
desire to suppress speech rather than to prevent harm.
It’s true that the Supreme Court has at times said that “In determining 
whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, we look to the 
purpose behind the regulation.”91  But the Court has also acknowledged that 
“while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances 
to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a 
showing in all cases.”92 The better formulation is the one the Court has 
often used:  A content-neutral law is one that is “justified without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech”93—and a law that is content-based as 
applied is indeed justified, in that application, with reference to what the 
speech communicates.94
90 Prosecutors may still have discretion in deciding whom to charge under those laws, 
and they may exercise that discretion out of a desire to suppress certain viewpoints, rather 
than to evenhandedly prevent the harm that the law is aimed at preventing.  But that risk is 
equally present for any law that may be applied to speech, including generally applicable 
laws that are speech-neutral on their face and content-neutral as applied.
91 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
92 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526 n.9 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 642-643 (1994)).
93 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 719 (2000); U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000); 
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989); TRIBE, supra note 39, at 789; John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A 
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975); Stone, supra note 25, at 211-17 (taking a similar 
view, but limited to those restrictions where the communicative impact consists of 
persuading, informing, or offending people).
94 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), a prison speech case, did interpret a 
“content-neutrality” rule as focusing on the government’s ultimate motive rather than 
whether the rule restricted speech based on its content.  The Court upheld a restriction on 
speech with certain kinds of content (for instance, information on weapons construction or 
alcohol production, encouragement of escape or other crimes, or “sexually explicit 
material” and especially homosexually themed material that “poses a threat to the security, 
good order, or discipline of the institution”) on the ground that it was “neutral” in the sense 
of being ultimately justified by an interest in prison security, rather than by dislike for 
certain viewpoints.  Id. at 415-16.  If a similar rule were applied outside prisons, then a 
wide range of speech restrictions—for instance, bans on advocacy of violence, draft 
evasion, sexism, and so on—would be treated as “content-neutral” simply because the 
government’s ultimate purpose is to prevent harmful conduct.  Fortunately, this approach 
seems to be limited to restrictions on prisoner speech; Thornburgh itself stressed that it was 
applying an unusual definition of neutrality (“the technical sense in which we meant and 
used that term [‘neutral’] in Turner [v. Safley],” id. at 415-16).
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2. Content-based applications vs. content-neutral applications
a. The problem
This still leaves something of a question:  Why, exactly, should a 
generally applicable law that is content-based as applied be treated 
differently from a generally applicable law that is content-neutral as 
applied?  The Court probably would not and should not have intervened if 
Hustler had inflicted emotional distress on Falwell by using loud bullhorns 
outside Falwell’s house. Nor would there be any First Amendment 
violation if the NAACP had been sued for organizing a demonstration that 
blocked the entrance to Claiborne Hardware’s door, or if Schenck had been 
prosecuted for interfering with the draft by blocking a draft board office.
But why?  The law, and thus the lawmakers’ motivation for enacting the 
law, would be the same in these hypotheticals as in the real cases.  The 
law’s effect would be the same:  The law as applied would restrict speech.  
What then is left to explain the difference?  And if indeed the lawmakers’ 
motivation doesn’t have the importance that some assign to it, then what is 
the difference even between facially content-based laws and facially 
content-neutral ones?  There are, I think, two main answers to this—a 
conceptual one and a pragmatic one.
b. The conceptual distinction
Under nearly every theory of free speech, the right to free speech is at 
its core the right to communicate—to persuade and to inform people 
through the content of what a speaker says. The right must also generally 
include in considerable measure the right to offend people through the 
content of one’s message, since much speech that persuades some people 
also offends others.95
Persuading and informing people may certainly cause harm; the 
listeners might be persuaded to do harmful things.  But the premise of 
modern First Amendment law is that the government generally may not 
95
 There might be some limits on this right to offend, for instance if (1) the speaker is 
communicating to someone who has already said that he doesn’t want to hear the message, 
and (2) the speaker can stop speaking to this unwilling listener, while still continuing to try 
to persuade or inform other potentially willing listeners.  Cf. Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (adopting this view as to unwanted mailings sent to people’s 
homes); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (adopting this view as to residential 
picketing, though in my view not so persuasively as in Rowan); Eugene Volokh, Comment, 
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1863-66 (1992) 
(suggesting such an approach as to hostile environment harassment law).
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(with limited exceptions) punish speech because of a fear, even a justified 
fear, that people will make the wrong decisions based on that speech.
“The people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for 
judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. . . .  [I]f 
there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and 
arguments advanced [by speakers], it is a danger contemplated by the 
Framers of the First Amendment.”96 Punishing speech because its content 
persuades, informs, or offends thus conflicts especially seriously with the 
free speech guarantee, more so than punishing speech for reasons unrelated 
to its potential persuasive, informative, or offensive effect.
c. Practical effects
i. Content-based restrictions as likely greater burdens on speech
This conceptual distinction may itself help explain the Court’s 
judgments both as to facially content-based laws and as to laws that are 
content-based only as applied.97  But it also reflects the likelihood that 
allowing content-based restrictions (whether they are facially content-based 
or content-based as applied) is likely to end up burdening speech more than 
allowing content-neutral restrictions would. 98
To begin with, a typical law aimed at noncommunicative effects is 
unlikely to excessively inhibit the communication of some viewpoint or 
fact, because many different media would remain available to the 
speakers.99 For instance, even a total ban on leafleting, justified by the 
96
 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978); see also Linmark Assocs. 
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Stone, Content Regulation and the 
First Amendment, supra note 34, at 213; Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in 
the First Amendment, ___ CREIGHTON L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004).
97 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1969) (distinguishing 
restrictions aimed at the “speech” elements of expressive conduct from those aimed its 
“nonspeech” elements); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
98
 I’ll use these terms as roughly interchangeable with restrictions triggered by the 
communicative effects of speech and restrictions triggered by the noncommunicative 
effects, though there might be some differences in some situations.
Some commentators have also argued that content-based restrictions are more 
dangerous than content-neutral ones because they often distort public debate, by burdening 
one side of a debate while allowing another to be heard free of any such burden.  See, e.g., 
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 22, at 217-27.  Others 
have disagreed.  See, e.g., Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose, supra note 22, at 445-
51.  My analysis neither relies on nor rejects the distortion argument—I focus on whether a 
restriction is likely to substantially interfere (as opposed to only modestly interfere) with 
the expression of certain facts or viewpoints, not on whether it’s likely to interfere more 
with one side of the debate than with another.
99 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 75 
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desire to prevent litter, would still leave people free to communicate their 
views by the many media that don’t create litter—by displaying signs, by 
using radio broadcasts, by advertising in newspapers, and so on.
The leafleting ban would indeed interfere with public debate, in my 
view too much.  But it can’t entirely drive certain views from public debate, 
or even come close to it.  Moreover, because the content-neutral law can 
potentially apply to a wide range of speakers, its scope will likely be limited 
by political forces.100  The most severe hypothetical content-neutral laws—
for instance, a ban on printing, justified by the environmental harms caused 
by the process of making paper101—are thus sure to remain just 
hypotheticals:  They are politically implausible precisely because they 
burden so much speech.
On the other hand, a content-based restriction, whether facially content-
based or content-based as applied, can outlaw most expression of certain 
facts or opinions.  If a law—such as the laws in Schenck or Claiborne—
bans any conduct that may cause a certain harm, and that harm can be 
caused by people’s being persuaded to act in certain ways, then any 
viewpoints that have the potential for such persuasion (the draft is evil, 
blacks should boycott white-owned businesses) would end up being largely 
prohibited.  Because the law focuses either on the content of the speech, or 
on the harm that the speech causes, it can block the speech in all media.  
And because it’s limited to a narrow range of speech, it may face less 
political opposition than broader bans might provoke.102
(1987) (“[E]ven in such cases [where a content-neutral restriction has a strong content-
differential effect], the harm that can flow from judicial miscalculation is limited.  Content-
neutral restrictions usually limit the availability of only particular means of expression.  
They are thus unlikely substantially to block the communication of particular messages.”).
100 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 336-37 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“the best protection against governmental attempts to 
squelch opposition . . . [has been] the requirement that the government act through content-
neutral means that restrict expression the government favors as well as expression it 
disfavors”).
101 See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 14 BERK. 
TECH. L.J. 713, 722-23 (2000) (suggesting as an example a law that bans newsprint to save 
trees); cf. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 99, at 58 (suggesting as an 
example a law that would neutrally ban all speeches, leaflets, newspapers, magazines, and 
radio or television broadcasts).
102
 Of course, restrictions on popular conduct, or on conduct engaged in by a politically 
powerful minority, may indeed face serious political opposition.  But conduct restrictions 
in a democracy tend to ban only unpopular conduct, such as interference with the war effort 
(as in Schenck), and with it equally unpopular speech.  Such generally applicable 
restrictions may therefore be fairly easy to enact, since they target only a relatively small 
and unpopular group.  Content-neutral restrictions on speech (such as leafleting or 
picketing), on the other hand, would restrict many political groups from all over the 
political spectrum.  If such content-neutral restrictions are too burdensome, they would thus 
1-Sep- 04] SPEECH AS CONDUCT 29
Even a narrower content-based restriction, such as the law involved in 
Cohen v. California or Hustler v. Falwell, can be quite burdensome.  True, 
because the restriction restricts only the words one can use (in Cohen) or the 
level of vitriol (in Hustler), it wouldn’t broadly prohibit the expression of a 
particular fact or idea.  But, as Justice Harlan rightly concluded in Cohen, 
even such restrictions can seriously interfere with people’s ability to express 
the “otherwise inexpressible emotions” that only certain kinds of words can 
effectively capture.103 Harsh contempt for a policy (the draft) or a person 
(Jerry Falwell) is itself a viewpoint that’s subtly different from mild-
mannered condemnation, and prohibitions on harsh language seriously 
interfere with the ability to convey this viewpoint.
ii. The limits of the “ample alternative channels” inquiry, both as to 
content-neutral and content-based restrictions
I have argued that content-based restrictions are dangerous because they 
risk broadly suppressing certain viewpoints or facts.  But one could respond 
that, instead of presumptively prohibiting content-based speech restrictions, 
courts could try to prevent serious burdens on speech the same way they do 
with content-neutral restrictions—by asking whether the restrictions leave 
open “ample alternative channels” for expression.104 I think, though, that 
the Court has been right to reject such proposals,105 and to treat content-
based restrictions as presumptively unconstitutional without an inquiry into 
how much the restriction burdens speech or into whether it leaves open 
ample alternative channels.
To begin with, the record of the ample alternative channels inquiry in 
the content-neutral restriction test hasn’t been very good.  The Court has at 
times applied it in a demanding manner, for instance insisting that 
alternative channels aren’t ample if they materially raise the price of 
speaking, make it harder for speakers to reach the same listeners, or subtly 
influence the content of the message by changing the medium.106  But at 
other times, the Justices have treated this requirement as only a weak 
constraint.107  And this is to be expected, given the vagueness of the term 
likely arouse a wide range of opposition, which provides a natural political check on their 
scope.
103
 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971).
104 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-57 (1994).
105 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879-80 (1997); City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980).
106 Id. at 56-57.
107 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986)
(holding that a zoning law that banned adult theaters from 95% of the land in a city left 
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“ample.”
In fact, the chief practical limit on content-neutral restrictions has not 
been the “ample alternative channels” inquiry, but the political reality I 
mentioned above:  Most practically enactable restrictions on the 
noncommunicative aspects of speech do leave open fairly substantial 
alternative channels for expressing the same ideas.  So even if the Court 
underenforces the ample alternative channels prong, few views or subjects 
will likely be broadly silenced.108
But it’s much more likely that a politically feasible restriction on the 
communicative aspects of speech will substantially block people from 
expressing a particular viewpoint.  That’s so even if the restriction has to be 
framed as facially viewpoint-neutral, or even as speech-neutral—consider, 
for instance, the Espionage Act in Schenck.  So judicial underenforcement 
of the ample alternative channels prong for content-based restrictions would 
be much more dangerous than it is for content-neutral restraints.
iii. The limits of the “ample alternative channels” inquiry as to content-
based restrictions
So underenforcement of the ample alternative channels prong is 
especially likely to yield serious harms to free speech if the prong were 
applied to content-based restrictions.  But there’s also more reason to worry 
that the prong would indeed be underenforced when applied to content-
based restrictions (whether they are facially content-based or content-based 
as applied).
“Ample” is a vague term, and one that requires contestable predictions
about the law’s effects on a complex system of speakers and listeners.  
There is a large gray area in which the quality of the alternative channels 
open ample alternative channels, though this apparently substantially increased the likely 
expense of renting or buying space, and likely made the theaters less accessible); Members 
of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 & n.13 (1984) (holding 
that a ban on posting leaflets on city-owned utility poles left open ample alternative 
channels, though the alternatives seemed likely to be considerably more expensive); 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 544 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (articulating 
and applying the test for content-neutral speech restrictions without even mentioning the 
ample alternative channels inquiry, in a case where the speech restriction probably left 
open very few realistic channels for communicating the facts that the speaker wanted to 
communicate); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) 
(articulating and applying the test for content-neutral speech restrictions without even 
mentioning the ample alternative channels inquiry); cf. JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, 
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 35, 39 (1999) 
(pointing out that content-neutral restrictions are nearly always upheld).
108 See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 34, at 226; 
supra note 99.
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would be hard to estimate. And when the restriction will likely cover only a 
particular message—pro-boycott speech, anti-draft speech, and so on—the 
normal risk of judicial error and deliberate or subconscious prejudice 
becomes magnified, because the judges know well which side of the 
political debate will lose and which will win as a result of their decision.109
In such a scenario, it’s especially likely that judges will apply the vague 
“ample alternative channels” standard in a way that’s not protective enough 
of unpopular speakers.  It’s probably no accident that the low water mark of 
the requirement, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,110 involved a 
restriction that was limited to sexually themed speech, even though the 
Court treated it as content-neutral.111
Moreover, one restriction aimed at the communicative impact of certain 
speech is likely to be followed by other such restrictions.  Content-based 
restrictions don’t appear randomly:  They arise because some fairly 
powerful political group (in government or out of it), believes a certain kind 
of speech is dangerous—or, as to laws that are content-based as applied, 
believes that all conduct that’s likely to cause certain effects is dangerous.
If this group succeeds in restricting, say, Communist speech in some 
contexts, it seems likely that it will also want to restrict Communist speech 
in other contexts.  If a movement tries to restrict bigoted speech in 
workplaces, perhaps using generally applicable hostile work environment 
harassment law, it will also likely try to use similar educational and public 
accommodations harassment rules to restrict speech in educational 
institutions or places of public accommodation.112  (That has in fact been 
the pattern of restrictions on Communist advocacy, antiwar speech, sexually 
themed speech, pro-civil-rights speech, and racist speech.)
Each success will help validate the pro-restriction group’s positions in 
the eyes of voters and legislators who are on the fence.113  Moreover, each 
success may reinforce the enthusiasm of the supporters of the 
109 See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 34, at 225 
(“judicial evaluations of viewpoint-based restrictions are especially likely to ‘become 
involved with the ideological predispositions of those doing the evaluating’”) (quoting 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980)); WEINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 
40 (noting this risk of judicial viewpoint discrimination, whether deliberate or 
subconscious).
110
 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986) .
111 Id. at 46-49.
112 See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton 
Administration, supra note 7. 
113 See Eugene Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 
1077-1105 (2003) (describing such “attitude-altering slippery slopes”); Daniel A. Farber, 
Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 737-
38 (1980) (noting that content-based classifications may “stigmatiz[e] the categories they 
single out for special treatment”).
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restrictions.114 And government restrictions on such speech are also likely 
to be accompanied by private restrictions on such speech, for instance by 
private broadcasters, publishers, employers, and commercial property 
owners.
This means that even when each restriction standing alone imposes only 
a modest burden on speech, the aggregate of all the restrictions can end up 
being quite burdensome.  It is, of course, possible for courts to consider this 
risk, to allow only the first few restrictions, and then to strike down any new 
restrictions once the alternative channels seem to no longer be ample.  But 
that’s a hard project for courts to engage in, especially when they are armed 
only with a vague standard like “ample alternative channels.”
Judges may find it hard to explain why two seemingly similar 
restrictions are being treated differently, just because of the order in which 
they were enacted.  And because “ample” lacks an objective absolute 
definition, courts may end up applying a relative criterion—how many 
channels the restriction leaves open compared to those available before this 
restriction was enacted, or how many it leaves open compared to those that 
it shuts down.  If that’s so, then courts might indeed allow a sequence of 
restrictions that gradually substantially reduces the alternative channels, 
even if the courts would have struck down a restriction that tried to impose 
the same burden at once.115
d. Conclusion
For all these reasons, the Court has been right to treat restrictions that 
114 See id. at 1121-27 (describing such “political momentum slippery slopes”).
115 See id. at 1105-14 (describing such “small change tolerance slippery slopes”).
This tendency might also occur with restrictions aimed at the noncommunicative 
impact of speech.  A billboard ban, a home sign ban, or a leafleting ban, for instance, may 
be part of a broader movement that values calm and esthetics above free speech.   See 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 99, at 74 (observing that government 
officials “are usually deeply committed to the maintenance of order and the conservation of 
resources,” which may lead them to systematically support even content-neutral speech 
restrictions that seem to make public places calmer, or diminish the government’s 
administrative or police protection burdens).  Such a movement may indeed end up 
yielding a sequence of these sorts of restrictions.
Still, this seems considerably less likely than with restrictions aimed at the 
communicative impact of speech.  First, the movement will be more likely to run up 
against political opposition from a range of speakers, including some possibly fairly 
popular ones.   Second, the restrictions are less likely to draw from the same base of 
support:  For instance, many people who hate billboards will likely not be as troubled by 
leaflets or signs on people’s homes, since the noncommunicative impact of these media is 
quite different.  People who want to suppress Communist or racist speech, on the other 
hand, are more likely to want to suppress it in a wide range of media and locations.
1-Sep- 04] SPEECH AS CONDUCT 33
are content-based as applied—even if they are facially generally applicable 
to both speech and conduct—just like restrictions that are content-based on 
their face.  It’s the only approach that’s consistent with cases such as 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, and the 
others. It’s properly hostile to the government’s attempts to restrict speech 
because of the informative or persuasive power of the speech.  And it’s 
necessary to prevent the government from being able to broadly suppress 
certain facts and ideas.
When speech is punished precisely because of what it communicates—
for instance, because it may persuade  people to violate the law or to boycott 
someone, because it may offend some listeners, or because it may convey 
information that helps people commit crimes—the law is operating as a 
content-based speech restriction.  It is restricting speech precisely because
of what it speaks, and it must therefore be subjected to serious First 
Amendment analysis.  We ought not dodge this analysis by simply 
relabeling the speech as “conduct.”
III. SPEECH “BRIGADED WITH ACTION,” SPEECH AS AN ILLEGAL 
“COURSE OF CONDUCT,” AND SPEECH AS A “SPEECH ACT”
A. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.
“It rarely has been suggested,” Justice Black wrote for the Court in 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., in 1949, “that the constitutional 
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing 
used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal 
statute.”116  “It has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech 
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was 
in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either 
spoken, written, or printed.”117 Likewise, Justice Black joined two opinions 
characterizing Giboney as stating that speech may be punished when it’s 
“brigaded with illegal action.”118  Others have described the Giboney 
principle as authorizing restrictions on speech that is tantamount to a 
“speech act[].”119
116 336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949).
117 Id. at 502.
118
 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Garrison 
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (not joined by Justice Black on 
this point).
119 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying nn.55-60; Rice v. 
Paladin Press, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 1997).  Occasionally, as in the arguments 
about crime-facilitating speech, the Giboney argument may overlap with the “generally 
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Giboney used this reasoning to uphold an injunction against peaceful 
picketers who were trying to pressure a business “to agree to stop selling ice 
to nonunion peddlers.”120 Such an agreement, the Court said, would have 
violated Missouri trade restraint law, and enjoining such picketing therefore 
didn’t violate the First Amendment.  But the Giboney argument has also 
been used to justify many other kinds of speech restrictions as well:
(a) The Justice Department121 and a court of appeals122 have recently 
reasoned that Giboney lets the government restrict books that may 
inform people how to violate the law, at least when the publisher 
intends that those books help people commit crimes. 
(b) Justice Goldberg’s majority opinion in Cox v. Louisiana described 
Giboney as supporting the proposition that “[a] man may be 
applicable law” argument; but the Giboney argument is sometimes used even to defend 
laws that explicitly restrict speech, such as laws prohibiting the solicitation of crime.
120
 336 U.S. at 492.
121
[I]t is hard to imagine that the First Amendment would permit culpability or 
liability for publication of other bombmaking manuals that have a propensity to be 
misused by some unknown, unidentified segment of the readership, since sources 
of the same information inevitably will remain in the public domain, readily 
available to persons who wish to manufacture and use explosives. 
On the other hand, the constitutional analysis is radically different where the 
publica tion or expression of information is “brigaded with action,” in the form of 
what are commonly called “speech acts.”  If the speech in question is an integral 
part of a transaction involving conduct the government otherwise is empowered to 
prohibit, such “speech acts” typically may be proscribed without much, if any, 
concern about the First Amendment, since it is merely incidental that such 
“conduct” takes the form of speech.  “‘[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement 
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because 
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, 
either spoken, written, or printed.’”  Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 
447, 456 (1978) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 
502 (1949)).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying n.56.  Despite the opening 
sentence of the quote, the Justice Department used this argument to defend the 
constitutionality of a ban on “publication of . . . bombmaking manuals that have a 
propensity to be misused by some unknown, unidentified segment of the readership,” so 
long as the ban was limited to publishers who were “motivated by a desire to facilitate the 
unlawful use of explosives.”  Id. at text accompanying n.68.
122
 Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (relying on 
Giboney in allowing liability for publishing a book that described how contract murders 
can be committed); United States v. Savoie, 594 F. Supp. 678, 682 (W.D. La. 1984) 
(relying on Giboney in issuing injunction against, among other things, “distributing any 
document or other information to be used by taxpayers to avoid the payment of, or to 
obtain the refund of, federal income taxes, that is based on the false proposition that wages, 
salaries or other forms of compensation for labor or services not specifically excluded from 
taxation under Title 26 of the United States Code are not taxable income”).
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punished for encouraging the commission of a crime.”123  The Court 
cited as an example Fox v. Washington, a 1915 case that upheld the 
punishment of a newspaper editor who endorsed the propriety of 
nudism.124
(c) Some courts have likewise recently used Giboney to defend 
restrictions on doctors’ recommending medicinal marijuana to their 
patients.125
(d) Courts have similarly used the “conduct not speech” argument to 
justify restricting speech that creates an offensive work 
environment.126
(e) Courts have relied on Giboney to support restrictions on speech that
urges political boycotts aimed at pressuring governments to change 
their policies.127
(f) A state administrative agency has relied on Giboney to justify a 
123
 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965).
124
 236 U.S. 273 (1915).  See also State v. Musser, 175 P.2d 724, 731 (Utah 1946) 
(upholding criminal punishment for conspiracy to teach the propriety of polygamy, on the 
theory that “Expressions and the use of words may constitute verbal acts,” and therefore
“an agreement to advocate, teach, counsel, advise and urge other persons to practice 
polygamy and unlawful cohabitation, is an agreement to commit acts injurious to public 
morals within the scope of the conspiracy statute”) (emphasis in original), vacated and 
remanded, 333 U.S. 95 (1948); Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 827-29 (likewise justifying 
Brandenburg v. Ohio on the grounds that incitement intended to and likely to cause 
imminent illegal conduct is “participat[ion] in[] that course of conduct”).
125
 Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Pearson v. McCaff-
rey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001); see also Petition for Certiorari, Walters v. 
Conant, No. 03-40, at 20 (U.S. filed June 7, 2003, by the Solicitor General).  But see 
Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding such speech 
constitutionally protected).  These particular restrictions might be justifiable under a 
possible professional-client speech exception, see infra text accompanying notes 245-256, 
though I’m not sure that this is so.
126
 Jarman v. City of Northlake, 950 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (not citing 
Giboney, but reasoning that “verbal acts of sexual harassment are not protected speech”); 
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 860 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (not citing 
Giboney, but reasoning that “[pornographic] pictures and verbal harassment are not 
protected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work 
environment”); see also Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on 
“Racist Speech:” The View From Without and Within, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 631, 673 n.159, 
674 (1993) (taking a similar view, at least to speech by supervisors).
127 See Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1324 n.15 (8th Cir. 
1980) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting) (arguing, citing Giboney, that NOW’s advocacy of a 
boycott of Missouri businesses, aimed at getting Missouri to ratify the Equal Rights 
Amendment, might be constitutionally punishable as an antitrust law violation); Searle v. 
Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982) (holding, citing Giboney, that state Human 
Society’s advocacy of a tourist boycott of a county, aimed at getting the county to improve 
its dog pound, could be constitutionally punishable as interference with prospective 
business advantage).
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restriction on racially offensive business names.128
(g) The dissent in Cohen v. California (joined by Justice Black) cited 
Giboney to argue that wearing a jacket containing the phrase “Fuck 
the Draft” should be constitutionally unprotected:  “Cohen’s absurd 
and immature antic was mainly conduct and little speech.”129
B. But What Exactly Does Giboney Mean?
These applications of Giboney may seem puzzling, and in many respects 
inconsistent with recent First Amendment cases, such as Cohen, 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware.130  And this is 
so because the logic of Giboney itself is puzzling, and inconsistent with the 
logic of the more recent Supreme Court cases.  In particular, none of the 
obvious interpretations of Giboney’s rather ambiguous language makes 
much sense.
1. “Course of conduct” referring to the noncommunicative harms of 
speech
The modern Supreme Court caselaw has, of course, recognized a sort of 
conduct/speech distinction:  Speech or expressive conduct may be restricted 
because of harms flowing from its noncommunicative component (noise, 
obstruction of traffic, and the like)—which one might view as its “conduct” 
element—but not because of harms flowing from its communicative
component, the “speech” element.131 This is the now-standard distinction 
128 In re Urban League of R.I. v. Sambo’s of R.I., Inc., R.I. Comm. for Hum. Rts., Nos. 
79 PRA 074-06/06, 073-06/06, at 9 (Mar. 16, 1981) (relying partly on Giboney to conclude 
that the name “Sambo’s Restaurants” violated public accommodations laws because it was 
offensive to blacks).  But see Sambo’s Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 
(6th Cir. 1981) (stating that use of the name was protected by the First Amendment even if 
it was offensive to black customers); Sambo’s v. City Council of City of Toledo, 466 F. 
Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that it was unconstitutional for a city to deny sign 
permits to Sambo’s because of its name).
129
 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130
 Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cohen is of course inconsistent with the majority’s 
result.  The approval in Cox of restrictions on speech that urges illegal conduct is 
inconsistent with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  The approval of restrictions 
on speech urging boycotts is inconsistent with NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 
886 (1982).
131 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1969).  Occasionally, Giboney is 
indeed cited as supporting this conduct/speech distinction, and there it poses little 
difficulty.  See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (citing Giboney for the 
proposition that the law may bar “cordon[ing] off a street[] or entrance to a public or 
private building,” or might even nondiscriminatorily “forbid[] all access to streets and other 
public facilities for parades and meetings,” in order to prevent, for instance, interference 
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embodied in United States v. O’Brien and the many cases that rely on it.
But this can’t be the distinction Giboney, or the cases mentioned above 
that cite Giboney, is using:  All those cases, including Giboney, involve 
speech that’s restricted because of harms that flow from its content.
2. Conduct “evidenced . . . by means of language”
Nor are the cases simply relying on Giboney’s assertion that conduct 
can be punished even though it is “in part . . . evidenced . . . by means of 
language.”  Speech can indeed be used as evidence of prohibited conduct, or 
of a punishable intent that accompanies prohibited conduct.  A person’s 
expression of pro-Nazi opinions, for instance, may be evidence that the 
reason he helped a Nazi saboteur was to aid the Nazi cause.132
But this likewise doesn’t explain any of the cases mentioned above , nor 
Giboney itself.  In all those cases, it is the speech that’s being punished, not 
some other behavior of which speech is just the evidence.
3. “[I]llegal” “course of conduct” meaning speech that itself violates a law
One could try to explain the opinions that rely on Giboney by reasoning 
that the speech—picketing to achieve a certain result, advocating nudism, 
wearing profanities on one’s jacket, publishing a book describing how to 
commit a crime—violates a law, and in that sense becomes an “illegal” 
with traffic); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 325 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing 
Giboney for the proposition that private property owners may use trespass law to remove 
speakers from their property).
The Court has also at times suggested that some conduct is so unlike the traditional 
media of communication that it should be viewed as entirely outside the First Amendment, 
perhaps even when it’s being restricted for its communicative effects.  See O’Brien, 391 
U.S. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can 
be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
express an idea.”); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984) (citing the above-cited page from O’Brien, and stating that “We assume for present
purposes, but do not decide,” that overnight sleeping in a park to protest against 
homelessness may qualify as expressive conduct); WEINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 32
(1999) (taking a similar view).  But see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 
703 F.3d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the view that “sleeping 
is or can ever be seen for Fist Amendment purposes,” when the restriction on sleeping is 
aimed at the noncommunicative impact of the conduct, but reasoning that a “law directed at 
the communicative nature of conduct” must still face First Amendment scrutiny), rev’d sub 
nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).  This, though, 
wouldn’t apply to the examples in this Part, which involve traditional forms of expression 
(conversation, books, picketing, and the like).
132 See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641-42 (1947); see also Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
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“course of conduct.”  Likewise, one article suggests (though without citing 
Giboney) that “speech that amounts to the commission of an independently 
illegal act,” such as “bribery, perjury, and threats,” is constitutionally 
unprotected because it “is properly treated as action, even if it consists 
solely of words.”133
But the point of modern First Amendment law is that speech is 
sometimes protected even though it violates a law that restricts it. Speech 
that violates a latter-day Sedition Act,134 public profanity (as in Cohen v. 
California), and speech “encouraging the commission of a crime” (as in 
Cox v. Louisiana) would indeed be “illegal” “course[s] of conduct” under 
laws that prohibit such speech.  Such laws, though, are still speech 
restrictions, and are still rightly judged—and often struck down—under the 
First Amendment.135
Perjury is no less speech, and no more action, than was speech in 
violation of the Sedition Act, another form of falsehood that the law has 
sought to punish.  It may be speech in a particular context, such as in court 
or in an official form, but it is still communication that is punished because 
of what it communicates.  Perjury and threats should indeed be punishable, 
but because they fall within an exception to free speech protection, not 
because they are somehow not speech.136
133
 Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 836-37, 839 
(1993) (also theorizing that in such situations “The words do not cause the act.  The words 
are the act.”).  Professor Sunstein’s argument may well rest on an implicit theory about 
which words are unprotected because they’re acts, and which are protected even though 
they are acts (for instance, the act of sedition, encouragement of crime, and so on); but the 
portions of the article that I quote unfortunately do not make such a theory explicit.
134 1 Stat. 596 (1798); Sedition Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 553 (1918), repealed by Act of 
Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359.
135 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that encouraging the 
commission of crime is not punishable except when the encouragement is intended to and 
likely to cause imminent illegal conduct); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
288-92 (1964) (holding that seditious libel is not punishable); id. at 269 (condemning 
attempts to restrict speech that rely simply on “epithets” or “labels” such as “insurrection, 
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal 
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression”).  Sunstein, 
supra note 133, at 837, takes the view that advocacy of crime—even including punishable 
incitement—is speech rather than “action,” but doesn’t explain how a criminally 
punishable threat (action, in the article’s view) and criminally punishable incitement (not 
action) would differ in this respect.
136
 For perjury, the exception would be the one for knowingly false statements of fact.  
See New York Times v. Sullivan (stating that such statements are generally unprotected, 
unless they are seditious libel against the government); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. 
Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1829, 1841 (2003) (holding the same as to 
statements that aren’t defamatory but are fraudulent); quote accompanying note 209
(likewise stressing that perjury laws are speech restrictions).  Bribery might indeed involve 
action—the transfer of money—as well as speech, or might be punishable on the grounds 
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4. “[I]llegal” “course of conduct” meaning speech violating a generally 
applicable law
Some, though not all, of the cases that cite Giboney might be explained 
on the grounds that the speech violates a generally applicable law that bans 
a wide range of conduct including speech.137  This, though, would just 
reduce the Giboney principle to the principle described and criticized in Part 
II.
5. “Conduct” referring to a broader course of illegal behavior by the 
speaker
“[C]ourse of conduct” “in part initiated . . . or carried out by means of 
language” might be read as referring to some course of behavior that 
consists of both speech and other illegal behavior (or planned illegal 
behavior) by the speaker.  If I’m planning to kill someone at a particular 
place, and I lure him there by telling him to meet me there, then I might 
well be guilty of attempted murder, though my behavior partly consists of 
communication.138  This, though, wouldn’t fit the facts of Giboney, where 
the defendants were simply speaking.  Nor would it fit any of the other 
cases described above, where the speakers were likewise simply 
communicating, and not engaging in any nonspeech conduct.
6. “Conduct” referring to a broader course of illegal behavior by people 
other than the speaker
One might therefore read “course of conduct” “in part initiated . . . or 
carried out by means of language” as referring to the aggregate of the 
speaker’s speech and the conduct of people whom the speech might affect.  
If the course of conduct includes illegality, the theory would go, then the 
speech part of the course of conduct would be just as illegal as the action 
that the speech brings about.  This might fit the facts of Giboney, where the 
speaker was trying to pressure the employer into acting illegally, and of 
some of the lower court cases that cite Giboney.
that it involves a promise, which may be properly restrictable.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 228-232.
137 See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
138 Cf. Aiken v. Wilson, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904) (“The most innocent and 
constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if 
it is a step in a plot, neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the 
punishment of the plot by law.”).
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But such a reading would be inconsistent with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
and with the modern repudiation of cases such as Schenck and Debs.  
Schenck’s and Debs’s speech, for instance, would be protected today under 
the Brandenburg test, though both speakers were convicted for trying to 
produce some illegal nonspeech behavior—the crime of draft evasion—on 
the part of others.139 Brandenburg shows that speech is protected even 
when it tries to trigger illegal behavior by listeners, except for the unusual 
situations where the speech is intended to and likely to produce imminent
lawless conduct.  So if Giboney ever meant that speech may be restricted 
when it can indirectly bring about illegal conduct, that meaning has been 
overruled by Brandenburg.
7. “Conduct . . . carried out by means of language” referring to threat of 
action
Giboney might be interpreted as standing for the rather narrow 
proposition that threats of conduct may be constitutionally unprotected.  In 
addition to advocating a boycott, and advocating that Empire Storage & Ice 
stop dealing with nonunion ice peddlers, the picketers in Giboney made two 
sorts of threats: the threat of a boycott (essentially “Stop dealing with 
nonunion ice peddlers, or our friends will stop dealing with you”) and the 
threat that union members who crossed the picket line would be ejected 
from their union.
The Court seemed to rest its judgment partly on these threats.  The 
Justices argued that “all of appellants’ activities—their powerful 
transportation combination, their patrolling, their formation of a picket line 
warning union men not to cross at peril of their union membership, their 
publicizing—constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, which 
was in violation of Missouri’s valid law.”140  In doing so, the Court 
reasoned, “appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free speech 
or press” because “[t]hey were exercising their economic power together 
with that of their allies.”141  This “exercising . . . economic power” might 
have been referring to threatening to use one’s economic power to pressure 
people into changing their behavior.
Likewise, consider two early 1980s opinions citing Giboney. Searle v. 
Johnson held that the Humane Society’s advocacy of a boycott of a Utah 
county, aimed at getting the county to improve its dog pound, was 
unprotected speech that could be punished under the interference with 
139
 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 
U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
140
 336 U.S. at 498.
141 Id. at 503.
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business relations tort.142 Similarly, a dissenting opinion in Missouri v. 
NOW seemingly would have held the same about NOW’s speech urging a 
boycott of Missouri, aimed at getting the state legislature to ratify the Equal 
Rights Amendment.143  Both of these opinions might be understood as 
suggesting that the urged boycotts would have been illegal, and that threats 
of such boycotts are therefore unprotected.144
Nonetheless, a rule that threats of boycott are constitutionally 
unprotected would probably be unsound today, given NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware.  Claiborne also involved a threat of boycott, and a threat of 
ostracism (though only social ostracism rather than ejection from a union) 
of people who refused to comply with the boycott.  Yet the Court held the 
speech to be constitutionally protected, even without any inquiry into 
whether such boycotts and organized ostracism might have themselves 
violated Mississippi law.  This suggests that threats of a boycott, or at least 
of a politically motivated boycott, are indeed constitutionally protected 
speech.145
But even if the true meaning of Giboney is indeed focused on threats, 
and survives Claiborne Hardware, then the Giboney principle is far better 
captured simply by saying that threats of certain kinds of retaliation—and 
especially threats of illegal retaliation—are constitutionally unprotected, 
142
 646 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982).
143
 620 F.2d 1301, 1324 n.15 (8th Cir. 1980) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
144
 646 P.2d at 686-89; 620 F.2d at 1321-25.
145 Claiborne distinguished Giboney on the grounds that Giboney involved “regulat[ion 
of] economic activity,” rather than “prohibit[ion of] peaceful political activity such as that 
found in the boycott in [Claiborne],” 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982), but this strikes me as 
unsound.  Giboney and Claiborne both involved advocacy that was aimed at improving the 
position of a certain social group (union members in Giboney, blacks in Claiborne), and 
that worked by threat of economic activity (or inactivity), namely boycott of a certain 
business.  Of course, the speech in Claiborne was also motivated by the speakers’ beliefs 
about morality and justice, and sought to appeal to listeners’ beliefs about morality and 
justice; but union speech aimed at benefiting workers is also motivated by concerns about 
morality and justice as well as economics.  Certainly the labor movement has been an 
ideological and political movement and not just an economic one.  See Getman & Marshall, 
infra note 149, at 719 n.97.
The one possible distinction is that the Giboney picketers were trying only to get 
Empire Storage & Ice to change its economic practices; the Claiborne boycotters were 
trying to get stores to change their hiring practices but also (perhaps primarily) to get 
County officials to change their political decisions (as well as to stop engaging in some 
allegedly unconstitutional activity) as well as the County’s hiring practices.  458 U.S. at 
899-900.  Nonetheless, in an economy dominated by private business, trying to influence 
the decisions of the private sector is political activity just as is trying to influence the 
decisions of the public sector.
In any event, though, if Giboney is indeed limited to activity aimed at accomplishing 
purely economic ends, then it would be inapplicable in all the examples I gave at the start 
of this section.
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rather than by saying that speech is unprotected when it “carrie[s] out” an 
illegal “course of conduct.”146  And most of the applications of Giboney that 
I cited in Part III.A would then have to be rejected, because they have 
nothing to do with threats.
8. “Conduct” referring to picketing
Finally, Giboney also involved one other form of conduct—picketing 
itself, which the Court described as “more than free speech, since it 
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a 
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of 
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.”147
Peaceful picketing, it seems to me, should be treated no differently than 
any other kind of behavior used to communicate a message:  It should be 
restrictable to the extent that its noncommunicative elements cause harm, 
for instance if it’s too loud or blocks the entrance to a building, but not 
restrictable based on its message (again, unless the message falls within an 
exception to protection148).  And this should be so even if the message on 
the picket signs is very simple—essentially, “the labor movement wants you 
to boycott this business”—and not backed with a detailed explanation.  First 
Amendment law protects even simple symbols, from flagburning to black 
armbands.  The same should be true for the simple message “don’t 
patronize places, such as this one, that the union movement condemns.”149
146 See infra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing this issue).
147 336 U.S. at 503 n.6.  See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 529-30 (1950) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that picketing should be less 
constitutionally protected because “the loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by 
picket lines differentiate this form of expression from other modes of communication”).
148
 It’s possible that some of the Court’s willingness to restrict even peaceful picketing 
stems from the Justices’ sense that labor picketing generally is indeed inherently 
threatening to some extent—perhaps because it involves face-to-face confrontations 
between picketers who feel their livelihoods are at stake and others whom the picketers 
might see as jeopardizing those livelihoods, and because some labor picketing has 
historically indeed turned into violence.  I don’t think that this potential for violence should 
suffice to strip peaceful picketing of protection.  But to the extent that this reasoning 
suggests that Giboney and similar cases flowed from the Court’s tendency to protect 
picketing (or at least labor picketing) less than other speech, it further shows the 
impropriety of applying Giboney in other contexts.
149 I thus think that the distinction drawn by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in the 
judgment in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980)—where he 
voted to uphold a secondary picketing ban because it affected “only that aspect of the 
union’s efforts to communicate its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal, 
rather than a reasoned response to an idea”—is unsound.  See Julius G. Getman & F. Ray 
Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX. L. REV. 703, 719 n.97 
(2001) (reasoning that “appeal to one’s obligations as a union member or supporter” should 
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Nonetheless, Giboney was part of a long line of cases that did impose 
special restraints on picketing, restraints that would likely be 
unconstitutional as to other media.150 The speech in Giboney itself—speech 
urging a business to violate state restraint of trade laws and urging people 
not to patronize the business until it so acted—would probably be protected 
today if it were printed in a newspaper or on leaflets.  Such advocacy 
doesn’t seem to be both intended to and likely to produce imminent illegal 
conduct, the criteria set forth by Brandenburg v. Ohio as necessary for 
making speech into punishable incitement of illegal action.151
Likewise, consider a case that shortly followed Giboney, Hughes v. 
Superior Court.152 Hughes rejected the First Amendment claims of people 
who were peacefully picketing a store to pressure it into hiring black 
workers in proportion to the fraction of blacks in the store’s clientele.  
There was no powerful union, acting with the benefit of special legal 
be just as protected as “more cerebral appeals”); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Justice Frank 
Murphy and American Labor Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1900, 1908 (2002) (“if the viewer’s 
reaction is a genuinely voluntary, though relatively unthinking, reflex, how can the 
picketing that triggers the reaction be distinguished from the cryptic bumper stickers ‘Vote 
Free Choice’ or ‘Vote Right to Life’?”).
150 See, e.g., Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769
(1942); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 
Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 619 
(1980); TRIBE, supra note 39, at 826 (2d ed. 1987) (describing this line of cases).  See also 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not 
speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment,” citing Giboney
and Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950)).
151
 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (holding that 
advocacy of illegal conduct at some unspecified future time doesn’t satisfy the imminence 
requirement).  In the closely related context of secondary boycotts—union boycotts of a 
third party aimed at pressuring it to stop doing business with a struck employer—the 
Supreme Court has strongly suggested that leafleting and other speech would be 
constitutionally protected, even though picketing is not.  Compare Int’l Bhd. of Electrical 
Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 n.10 (1951) (holding picketing in aid of secondary 
boycotts to be unprotected, citing Giboney and cases that cited Giboney) with Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575-76, 580, 588 (1988) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act should not be 
read as banning leafleting aimed at persuading consumers to engage in a secondary 
boycott, because such a reading would pose “serious constitutional questions,” and resting 
its decision on the view that “picketing is qualitatively ‘different from other modes of 
communication’”).
152
 339 U.S. 460, 466 (1950).  Hughes relied on Giboney, among other cases, for the 
proposition that picketing may be restricted, see id. at 468; and three Justices relied solely 
on Giboney, id. at 468 (Black, J., joined by Minton, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
(Reed, J., concurring) (likewise relying solely on Giboney).   See also Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 292 (1957) (characterizing Hughes as an 
“elaborat[ion]” of Giboney).
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protections.  There was no violence or trespass by the picketers.  The 
picketers had no power to eject people from a union.
The picketers simply patrolled and expressed sentiments aimed at 
getting a store to act in a perfectly lawful way—under California law in 
1950, discriminatory hiring was not illegal.153 Newspaper articles urging a 
consumer boycott of businesses aimed at getting the businesses to adopt 
some legally permissible race-based hiring practice would likely have been
constitutionally protected. The advocacy, the Court stressed, was 
unprotected because it was conveyed through picketing.154
The lesser protection for picketing than for other speech continues to be 
the law, at least as to labor picketing.155  So long as it continues to be the 
law, Giboney reflects this exception to First Amendment protection.  But 
even if one endorses this lesser protection for picketing, such an exception 
offers no support for applying Giboney to other speech.
C. Supreme Court Applications of Giboney
So it’s hard to figure out just what line Giboney purported to draw—and 
the cases where the Court has cited Giboney to support its results only 
further suggest that Giboney is unhelpful for First Amendment analysis.  
Even when the results of those cases might be right, the “illegal course of 
153
 Justice Reed took the view that the California Supreme Court opinion held race 
discrimination to be unlawful, id. at 468 (Reed, J., concurring), but he was mistaken.  The 
California Supreme Court majority opinion, 198 P.2d 885 (Cal. 1948), never held this, and 
Justice Traynor’s dissenting opinion specifically pointed out that employers remained free 
to discriminate based on race.  198 P.2d at 896; see also Jones v. American President 
Lines, Ltd., 308 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. App. 1957) (stating, several years after Hughes, that 
“The right to private employment without discrimination on the basis of race is not one 
protected by the Constitution, by common law or any statute of the state that we are aware 
of; and so plaintiff has not alleged any violation of state or federal laws.”).  The California 
Supreme Court held only that picketing to pressure employers into discrimination was 
unlawful, not that employer discrimination was itself unlawful.  See Elliot L. Richardson, 
Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 n.86 (1951) 
(recognizing this); Osmond K. Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing—Constitutionally Protected?, 
99 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1950) (likewise).
154 See Hughes, 339 U.S. at 464 (stressing that the case involved picketing and not 
newspaper articles:  “Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may 
convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. 
But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, 
different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked and 
exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word.”).
155 Compare NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (upholding 
restrictions on secondary picketing) with Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast 
Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76, 588 (1988) (suggesting 
that leafleting aimed at the same end may well be constitutionally protected).
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conduct” principle generally doesn’t help justify those results.
I’ve already alluded to one example—the majority opinion in Cox v. 
Louisiana, which tried to use Giboney to explain restrictions on crime -
advocating speech and on fighting words:
The examples are many of the application by this Court of the principle 
that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or 
prohibited. The most classic of these was pointed out long ago by Mr. Justice 
Holmes:  “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a 
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Schenck v. 
United States.  A man may be punished for encouraging the commission of a 
crime, Fox v. Washington, or for uttering “fighting words,” Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire. This principle has been applied to picketing and parading in labor 
disputes.  See Hughes v. Superior Court; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice 
Co.; Building Service Employees, etc. v. Gazzam.  But cf. Thornhill v. 
Alabama. These authorities make it clear, as the Court said in Giboney, that 
“it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to 
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, 
written, or printed.”156
“Encouraging the commission of a crime,” though, was held to be 
constitutionally protected (except under narrow circumstances) just four 
years later, in Brandenburg v. Ohio.157  The prosecution in Fox, for 
publishing a newspaper article praising the practice of nudism, would 
clearly be unconstitutional today.158
Likewise, uttering words that may cause a fight would also be 
constitutionally protected today unless the words are specifically targeted at 
the offended party.159 This distinction in modern fighting words law 
between unprotected speech “directed to the person of the hearer”160 (“Fuck 
you” said to a particular person) and protected speech said to the world at 
large (“Fuck the draft” said on a jacket) may be sound.  But the Giboney 
principle that speech may be punishable when it carries out an illegal course 
of conduct doesn’t really help justify that distinction.
156
 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (citations abbreviated); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 
13, at 830 (defending bans on fighting words on the grounds that “such speech is properly 
regarded as an attempt to commence a fight—a particularized, prohibited course of 
conduct”).
157
 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
158
 Likewise, American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950), 
which upheld restrictions on Communists’ serving as union leaders, citing (among other 
cases) Giboney, id. at 399-400, is also probably not good law today.  See United States v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (striking down restrictions on Communists working in defense 
plants).
159 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 
(1971).
160 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
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Similarly, consider Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, where the Court 
upheld Ohralik’s punishment for “[i]n-person solicitation by a lawyer of 
remunerative employment.”161  The Court cited Giboney in arguing that 
such solicitation was constitutionally unprotected, and characterized the 
solicitation as “a business transaction in which speech is an essential but 
subordinate component.”162  But in Ohralik’s companion case, In re Primus, 
the Court made clear that direct solicitation by a lawyer of pro bono 
employment in a politically charged case may not be restricted.163
Both transactions were equally “course[s] of conduct,” in which speech 
to the client played an equal role.  If the Giboney principle stripped one 
solicitation of constitutional protection on the ground that the solicitation 
carried out an illegal course of conduct, it should have done the same to the 
other, and yet the two were treated differently.  The Court’s other 
justification for its Ohralik decision—that the speech in Ohralik was 
commercial speech said face-to-face, and the speech in Primus was 
noncommercial speech communicated in a letter164—may be a sound basis 
for distinguishing the two cases.  Giboney, though, is not.
Similarly, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited held 
that while legitimate litigation is immune from antitrust liability, because 
litigation constitutes the exercise of the First Amendment right to petition
the courts, “sham” litigation aimed at “eliminat[ing] an applicant as a 
competitor by denying him free and meaningful access to the agencies and 
courts” is unprotected.165  The Court relied primarily on Giboney, reasoning 
that “First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they 
are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.”166
But in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc., the Court explicitly limited this “sham litigation” exception 
to litigation that is both objectively frivolous and subjectively ill-
motivated.167  Under the Giboney rationale, objectively reasonable and 
unreasonable litigation would equally be “integral part[s] of conduct” aimed 
at monopolization; they should thus be treated equally.  Yet Professional 
Real Estate Investors recognizes that objectively reasonable litigation is a 
constitutionally protected exercise of the right to petition, and that’s true 
whether or not it is “an integral part of conduct” aimed at securing a 
monopoly.
161
 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978).
162 Id. at 456.
163
 436 U.S. 412, 434-35 (1978).
164 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56; Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-38.
165
 404 U.S. 508, 514-15 (1972).
166 Id.
167
 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
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The constitutionally significant distinction is between frivolous 
petitioning of the courts, which is unprotected by the Petition Clause against 
a wide range of liability, and objectively reasonable petitioning, which is 
protected.  It is not, as Giboney would suggest, between petitioning that’s an 
integral part of a broader pattern of conduct and petitioning that can’t be so 
described.
Likewise for New York v. Ferber and Osborne v. Ohio, which upheld 
bans on distributing and possessing child pornography, and argued in 
passing that
[T]he advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic 
motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an 
activity illegal throughout the Nation. “It rarely has been suggested that the 
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or 
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal 
statute.” Giboney.168
But not all speech that provides a motive for illegal conduct can be 
outlawed simply because it is “an integral part of conduct in violation of a 
valid criminal statute.”  When the New York Times publishes illegally 
leaked documents,169 or transcripts of an illegally excerpted conversation, it 
would have a strong First Amendment defense (assuming that it got the 
documents or tapes from an independent third party), even though the 
prospect of such publication may provide a motive for the illegal leak or 
illegal interception.170
In some narrow circumstances, there might be some constitutional 
justification for restricting the publication of the leaked material—for 
instance, if there is some extraordinary pressing national security 
concern171—just like there were other First Amendment reasons in Ferber
and Osborne which justified the child pornography exception to the First 
Amendment.172  But the broad Giboney “speech . . . used as an integral part 
168
 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1982), quoted in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 
U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
169
 The leak may be illegal because it violates a law that requires government 
employees to keep certain information confidential, a law that imposes a duty of loyalty on 
corporate employees, or trade secret law.  See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 697, 739-48 (2003) (discussing this).
170 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978).
171 Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 735-40 (1971) (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.) (suggesting that publishing illegally 
leaked national security secrets might well be criminally punishable); id. at 752-59 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.) (concluding that such publication 
could even be enjoined).
172 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (stressing how harmful 
and how valueless child pornography is); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108,110-11 
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of conduct” argument can’t itself justify the restriction, or else all 
publication of illegally leaked documents would be treated the same way as 
publication of illegally created child pornography. 173
D. Rejecting Giboney
Giboney, then, is a poor basis for analyzing speech restrictions.  The 
case itself provides no clear rule distinguishing speech that’s 
constitutionally protected from speech that’s stripped of constitutional 
protection.  The cases applying Giboney don’t help, either.  Some of those 
cases use Giboney to reach results that are inconsistent with modern First 
Amendment law.  Others may reach results that fit the rest of the doctrine, 
but in those cases the real foundation for the decision is something other 
than the Giboney principle, and the citation of Giboney only obscures the 
true rationale.
The Supreme Court decided Giboney in 1949, when the Justices were 
still in the early stages of developing free speech doctrine.  Many of the 
speech-protective Supreme Court decisions of the modern era, such as 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, Cohen v. California, and NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware were still decades in the future.  It isn’t surprising that some of 
the applications of Giboney have proven to be inconsistent with these more 
recent cases.  If we endorse these more recent decisions, this should lead us 
to reject Giboney as a guide to modern free speech law.
IV. “SITUATION-ALTERING UTTERANCES”
I turn now to a third category of “speech as conduct” arguments, made 
famous in the First Amendment literature by Kent Greenawalt’s Speech, 
Crime, and the Uses of Language,174 and in the philosophy of language 
literature by J.L. Austin and John Searle.175 I will focus on Greenawalt’s 
approach; since Austin and Searle were philosophers of language rather 
than lawyers, their concern was with discussing how words are used by 
people, rather than with drawing legally significant distinctions, and their 
arguments are thus of limited help for First Amendment doctrine.176
(1990) (same).
173 See also Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 
1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 300 (1982) (likewise criticizing Ferber’s use of Giboney).
174 KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989).
175 J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH 
ACTS (1970).
176
 Austin, for instance, casts his book as a criticism of the “assumption of 
philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of 
affairs, or to ‘state some fact,’ which it must do either truly or falsely.”  AUSTIN, supra note 
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Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language contends that some kinds of 
statements—for instance, “I promise to help you commit this crime,” “I’ll 
raise my prices if you raise yours,” or “I will” said in a wedding 
ceremony—are constitutionally unprotected conduct rather than protected 
speech.177 And, the argument goes, the statements are conduct rather than 
speech for a peculiar reason:  They impose, as a matter of social convention, 
a felt moral obligation (on the speaker or on listeners).
Utterances are often a means for changing the social context in which we live. 
. . .  The conventions of language and of ordinary social morality make certain 
utterances, such as promises, count as far as one’s moral obligations are 
concerned.  My essential claim—a central claim for this book—is that 
utterances of these sorts are situation-altering and are outside the scope of a 
principle of free speech.  Such utterances are ways of doing things, not of 
asserting things.178
Such “situation-altering utterances” (the book’s term) aren’t limited to 
statements that create legal obligations:  For instance, even a legally 
unenforceable agreement to commit a crime or to set prices, or even a 
legally ineffective wedding (for instance, a wedding that all observers know 
to be a legally unrecognized same-sex or polygamous wedding), would 
qualify.  Nor are they limited to statements that create obligations that most 
of us would recognize as morally binding; a promise to kill someone may 
175, at 1.  He then proceeds to disprove that assumption, by pointing out how words can be 
used in a “performative” sense as well as the fact-declaring “constative” sense, and in the 
process includes within the “performative” category statements that “criticize,” “predict,” 
“estimate,” “advise,” “recommend,” “warn,” “urge,” and “plead,” id. at 83, 85-86, 140, 
147, 155.  This makes clear that the performative/constative line isn’t immediately helpful 
to lawyers who are trying to distinguish protected speech from unprotected speech-as-
conduct, even if it is helpful to philosophers who are trying to understand how people 
communicate.  Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 58 (making the same observation 
about Austin’s “performative” utterances, and stressing that “situation-altering utterances” 
are a “much narrower [category] than Austin’s category of performatives”).
Austin’s categories of “locutionary act[s]” (“uttering a certain sentence with a certain 
sense and reference), “illocutionary acts” (for instance, “informing, ordering, warning, 
undertaking, &c, i.e., utterances which have a certain (conventional) force”), and 
“perlocutionary acts” (“what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as 
convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading”), are even less 
suited to providing constitutionally significant distinctions, and I have no reason to think 
that Austin or Austin’s modern heirs would argue otherwise.  Even if some kinds of 
illocutionary acts, such as undertaking in the sense of promising to do something, might be 
constitutionally unprotected, other illocutionary acts—for instance, “informing”—surely 
are.  Likewise, the perlocutionary acts of “convincing” and “persuading” must certainly be 
constitutionally protected.  Austin, supra note 175, at 108; see also id. at 102 
(distinguishing “the locutionary act ‘he said that . . .’ from the illocutionary act ‘he argued 
that . . .’ and the perlocutionary act ‘he convinced me that . . .’”).
177 Id. at 239.
178 Id. at 57-58 (footnotes and paragraph break omitted).
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not be morally binding, but it’s treated as situation-altering.  Rather, the 
argument goes, they encompass all statements that affect someone’s felt 
moral obligations, simply by virtue of the statement’s having been made—
so long as one’s fellow criminals feel that one is morally bound by a 
criminal conspiracy, one’s statement agreeing to participate in the 
conspiracy is considered situation-altering.
Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language has been justly lauded, and 
while I disagree with it in some measure, I don’t intend to critique it in 
detail here.  I do, however, want to offer two observations about its 
“situation-altering utterance” theory.
A. The Doctrine’s Limited Scope
First, it’s important to recognize the limits that Speech, Crime, and the 
Uses of Language itself imposes on this “speech as conduct” category.
“Situation-altering utterances,” as the book defines them, certainly do 
not cover all attempts to “do things with words” or to “alter” the “situation” 
by speaking. People often use simple assertions of facts or ideas, which the 
book excludes from the definition of situation-altering utterances,179 to do 
things.  When a newspaper publishes an editorial advocating some new 
welfare policy, or urging citizens to recycle, it is trying to accomplish a 
certain result—a substantive change in people’s conduct.  Such clearly 
constitutionally protected speech often “alters” the “situation” by its 
persuasive or informative force, through the process of “alter[ing] the 
listener’s understanding of the world he inhabits.”180  But that doesn’t make 
it fit within the definition of “situation-altering.”181
Nor does the definition include all statements that change people’s felt 
moral obligations.  Telling people that some seemingly benign behavior is 
harmful to others, for instance, may impose on them a moral obligation to 
avoid such harm.  A man who is told that he has a communicable disease 
has different moral (and perhaps legal) obligations to others than one who 
thinks he’s well.  But such statements that reveal preexisting facts are 
treated as speech, not as constitutionally unprotected “situation-altering” 
conduct, even though they do change people’s moral obligations.182
179 See id. at 57 (distinguishing situation-altering utterances from “claims of fact or 
value”).
180 Id. at 59.
181 Id. at 59-60.  Under the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language framework it 
might, at least in some cases, qualify as a “weak imperative,” id. at 68-71, or as “action-
inducing,” Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 683-85, 
but the book makes clear that such speech is still presumptively protected, and doesn’t 
count as situation-altering in his scheme, GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 59-60.
182 GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 61-62.
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Rather, the “situation-altering utterances” category is limited to 
statements that “actually alter the normative world, shifting rights or 
obligations” because of their very assertion, and not because of any facts or 
ideas that they reveal.183  A promise, for instance, imposes a perceived 
moral obligation on the promisor.184  An order by someone in a position of 
authority obligates the ordered person to do something.185
These statements affect people not because they communicate some pre-
existing fact or idea that exists outside the speaker’s control.  Rather, such 
statements—“exercises of official authority, agreements, promises, orders, 
offers, manipulative inducements, and manipulative threats”—affect people 
chiefly because the speaker has made them.  And, the argument goes, the
statements should therefore be treated as constitutionally unprotected action 
rather than constitutionally protected speech.186
This definition means that very little, if any, of the speech I described in 
previous sections—speech that some people have argued should be treated 
as merely “conduct”187—would constitute “situation-altering utterances.”  
Speech that communicates information about how a crime can be 
effectively committed would not be situation-altering.  Such speech, 
whether in a novel, chemistry textbook, or murder manual, would simply be 
an “assertion[] of fact,”188 albeit a potentially dangerous one.
Likewise, speech that creates an offensive work, educational, or public 
accommodations environment is generally the assertion of offensive ideas
(for instance, that some groups are inferior, or that women should be seen as 
sex objects rather than equals in the workplace189) and not an agreement, 
183 Id. at 59-60.
184 Id. at 63-65.  I will generally speak in this section of “felt moral obligations” or 
“perceived moral obligations,” which is to say moral obligations that some people are 
likely to recognize, whether or not the obligation is legally enforceable or morally valid.  
This definition reflects the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language definition of what 
statements are situation-altering, see id. at 59-60, and it’s necessary for the book’s 
argument to work:  An agreement to commit a crime or to fix prices, for instance, is 
“situation-altering” even if it’s legally unenforceable and morally valid—it is “situation-
altering” because the parties will perceive it as imposing a moral obligation on them.
185 Id. at 65.
186 Id. at 58.  Greenawalt excludes from this list agreements that themselves concern 
speech; as to such agreements, “the subject of the agreement makes a free speech principle 
relevant,” id. at 64; see also id. at 335-37.
187 See supra text accompanying notes 2-18 and notes 120-129.
188 GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 58 (distinguishing situation-altering utterances 
from assertions of fact).
189 See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-07 (M.D. 
Fla. 1991); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987);  
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1212 n.118 (1989); Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, 
Centerfolds, and Censorship, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403, 438 (1991).
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promise, order, or the like.  Same for speech praising jury nullification, 
speech that urges the moral propriety of a boycott, or speech that 
recommends marijuana to a patient.
Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language actually deals with more than 
situation-altering utterances; other sections of the book discuss crime-
facilitating speech, offensive speech, speech urging illegal or harmful 
behavior, and the like.190  But the book correctly treats the latter categories 
of speech as assertions of fact and value, and thus as presumptively 
constitutionally protected speech, rather than as unprotected situation-
altering utterances.  And the book then analyzes the costs and benefits of 
restricting the speech, and concludes that a good deal of such speech should 
indeed be protected, though some can be properly restricted under some 
exception to First Amendment protection.
B. The Questionable Relevance of Altering Felt Moral Obligations
As I mentioned, the premise of the “situation-altering utterances” 
argument is that when a statement’s utterance imposes—as a matter of 
social convention—a felt moral obligation (on the speaker or on listeners), 
the statement stops being speech and becomes conduct.191
This is how the book explains the widely shared belief that agreements 
and offers aren’t protected as free speech.192  Promises create a felt “moral 
obligation,” which “the people who have made [the promise perceive] as 
having [moral] force.”193  The promises trigger a “convention[] . . . of 
ordinary social morality” that one should keep one’s promises; and the 
violation of this convention “renders [the promisors] vulnerable to 
counterresponses,”194 which is what makes the promise situation-altering.
Likewise, some other speech (what the book calls “permissions”) waives
felt moral obligations rather than creating them, and it too is thus situation-
altering.
But why should a statement’s creating a felt moral obligation turn the 
statement from presumptively constitutionally protected speech into 
unprotected conduct?  There are, after all, lots of social conventions under 
which the very making of a statement will be seen by some as increasing 
the speaker’s moral obligations, or increasing or decreasing the listener’s 
190 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 85-87, 110-29, 141-57, 260-80, 287-
313.
191 Id. at 57-58 (footnotes and paragraph break omitted).
192 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982).
193 Id. at 63; id. at 65 (making clear that the same analysis applies to unilateral 
promises as well as to bilateral agreements).
194 Id. at 58, 63.
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moral obligations.195  Consider just four examples:
(a) The felt moral impropriety of hypocrisy.  There is a perceived moral 
duty to avoid hypocrisy—to act consistently with what one says.  If 
a speaker says that all soldiers fighting in a war are murderers, he is 
implicitly undertaking a moral obligation to refuse to fight in the 
war.  His very statement makes many people expect that he will 
practice what he preaches.  As with a promise, the “utterance[ has] 
alter[ed the speaker’s] normative obligations, what [he] should do in 
the future.”  “The conventions of language and of ordinary social 
morality,” here the moral condemnation of hypocrisy, make this 
utterance “count as far as one’s moral obligations are concerned.”196
(b) The felt moral relevance of peers’ and leaders’ moral permissions.  
People perceive—rightly or wrongly—that they may do what the 
leaders of their community, or their peers, think is permissible.  
When either a leader or a large peer group says that “it’s fine to 
refuse to deal with people of other ethnic groups,” many people 
might feel less of an obligation to act in a nondiscriminatory way.197
(c) The felt moral relevance of peers’ and leaders’ moral demands. 
People also sometimes feel that they should do what leaders or peers 
think is necessary.  For instance, when the leader or the peers say 
“one should refuse to deal with people of other ethnic groups,” 
many people might feel something of an obligation to engage in 
such an ethnic boycott.  In both this example and the last one, the 
leader’s or peers’ “utterance[ has] alter[ed the listener’s] normative 
obligations, what [he] should do in the future”—in the earlier 
example, by weakening the listener’s normative obligation not to 
discriminate, and in this example by imposing a new obligation to 
discriminate.  (The obligation may be morally controversial, not 
195
 Under the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language framework, either of these 
three kinds of change to moral obligations would make a statement situation-altering.  See 
id. at 63-65 (promises are situation-altering because they increase the speaker’s felt moral 
obligations); id. at 65 (permissions are situation-altering because they decrease the 
listener’s felt moral obligations, by allowing the listener to do something that he might 
have otherwise seen as immoral); id. at 65 (orders are situation-altering because they 
increase the listener’s felt moral obligations).  The missing fourth category is statements 
that decrease a speaker’s moral obligations, but I take it that it’s rare that people can 
decrease their own felt moral obligations just by speaking, and if they can do so, then 
perhaps the obligations weren’t that obligatory in the first place.
196 Id. at 57-58.  Perhaps it might not count as much as a statement that “I promise not 
to drink alcohol,” or especially “we mutually promise to each other not to drink alcohol,” 
but it does count.
197
 “Situation-altering utterances” include statements that diminish a listener’s moral 
obligations—for instance, a permission such as “Go ahead and hit me, I wish you’d try it.”  
Id. at 65.
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very strong, and not equally felt by everyone; but the same is true of 
many promises, especially promises to do illegal things.)
(d) The felt professional obligation to respond.  In scholarship, and 
likely in other fields, there is a social convention that people ought 
to respond to their serious critics.  A scientist who fails to respond to 
his critics may be condemned by his peers, just as a scientist who 
fails to keep his promises may be condemned by his peers.  And this 
is so regardless of whether the critics persuade the peers:  The 
critics’ very making of the statements creates something of an 
obligation to respond.198
So all these cases satisfy the criteria for situation-altering utterances:  
The statements change the speaker’s, the listener’s, or the criticized 
person’s felt moral obligations.  The statements change the obligations 
simply by the statements’ having been made. Naturally, if the statements 
are especially persuasive, they also create an obligation through their 
persuasiveness.  But they create such an obligation even independently of 
their persuasiveness:  Even if most of the anti-war speaker’s audience isn’t 
persuaded that the war is evil, the speaker will still have incurred a felt 
moral obligation to act consistently with what he had said.
Yet it’s not clear that any of these statements “are ways of doing things, 
not of asserting things”; and even if they are both ways of doing things and 
of asserting things, it’s not clear that what they do should be any less 
constitutionally protected than what they assert.  Yes, they create or waive 
felt moral obligations.  But they do so by communicating, just as pure 
statements of fact or value sometimes create or waive felt moral obligations.
I suspect that most people’s first reaction to the statements described above 
is that they’re pure speech; and the “situation-altering utterance” theory 
doesn’t explain why we should take a different view.
I share the intuition that agreements and offers should be 
constitutionally unprotected.  But it seems to me that the “situation-altering 
utterances” framework—which theorizes that agreements and offers alter 
felt moral obligations, and that speech that alters felt moral obligations is 
unprotected—is not entirely persuasive.
It’s possible, even accepting the situation-altering utterance theory, to 
explain why the examples I give should remain constitutionally protected 
198 See id. at 144 (suggesting that some fighting words might be situation-altering 
because they create a felt moral obligation on the target to respond; a professional 
challenge may have even more obligatory force).  Of course, the felt moral obligation in 
one situation might be to fight, and in the other to speak.  But under the “situation-altering 
utterance” theory, both seem to be situation-altering utterances, because both do something 
(create a moral obligation, even if it’s just a moral obligation to say something) rather than 
merely communicating assertions of fact or value.
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despite their situation-altering component:  Banning such statements would 
also make it hard to convey the facts and opinions that they convey; 
banning overt promises or offers, on the other hand, would probably still 
leave people free to convey the same facts and opinions, just by changing 
their statements in some measure.  Speech, Crime, and the Uses of 
Language in fact sometimes suggests this sort of distinction,199 though it 
sometimes seems to take a different approach.200
This approach may even fit the way the First Amendment generally 
deals with behavior that consists both of conduct and of speech.  Say that 
expression of fact or opinion is done using physical conduct that’s harmful 
199 See id. at 60 (acknowledging that agreements to marry convey certain facts and 
opinions, but reasoning that “if we focus on opportunities for communication, whatever 
one wants to communicate about facts and values can typically be asserted much more 
straightforwardly by means other than a situation-altering utterance”); id. at 60-61 
(acknowledging that offers to bet convey “intensity of belief,” but reasoning that “Since a 
prohibition on betting would exert only a slight effect on people’s ability to express the 
certainty of their opinions, the betting example does not yield a very strong argument for 
treating situation-altering utterances like statements of fact, and we can rest with the 
generalization that a free speech principle does not reach situation-altering utterances”).
200
 At times the book inquiries whether the situation-altering aspect of an utterance 
“dominates” the assertions of fact or opinion.  See, e.g., id. at 57 (saying, in the first 
paragraph of the “Situation-Altering Utterances” section, that “I here examine some major 
uses [of language] which are common subjects of criminal statutes and which do not 
dominantly involve claims of fact or value”); id. at 60 (“Because the ‘performative’ aspect 
of most such utterances [such as agreements to marry] so entirely dominates any implicit 
claims of fact and value and because similar implicit claims are present in virtually all 
noncommunicative behavior, we need not alter our conclusion that a principle of free 
speech does not apply to situation-altering utterances as it applies to claims of fact and 
value.”).  This, though, strikes me as a mistaken approach.  As John Hart Ely famously put 
it, much expressive conduct is “100% action and 100% expression.” Ely, supra note 93, at 
1495.  Neither aspect is “dominant” in principle, and even if it could be, courts couldn’t 
practically decide which component dominates the other. Id.  Likewise as to supposedly 
situation-altering utterances:  A speech by a respected community leader praising a race-
based boycott is both a means of trying to persuade people, and a means of making them 
feel a moral obligation (or at least giving them a moral permission) to act as the respected 
leader suggests.  The same goes for peer pressure from fellow community members.  It’s 
not clear whether either factor can predominate in theory, and in any event it’s hard to see 
how one can decide which factor predominates in practice.
And the same is also true for the matters that the “situation-altering utterance” theory 
is trying to explain, such as agreements and offers.  A person’s going through a marriage 
ceremony—again, let’s assume that it’s not a legally binding ceremony—creates moral 
obligations, conveys facts about the person’s mental state, and often conveys the person’s 
moral beliefs (especially when the ceremony is controversial, for instance because it is a 
same-sex ceremony).  An offer to join a political conspiracy may likewise be at least as 
much a political statement as a statement that changes people’s felt moral obligations.  Yet 
the law would treat such offers and agreements as punishable offers and agreements, 
without any inquiry into which element “predominates.”  And Professor Greenawalt would 
presumably reach the same result.
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for reasons unrelated to the facts or opinions it conveys—for instance, when 
someone uses loud amplification to express his message.  The government 
may then generally restrict this mixture of expression and physical conduct 
if the restriction (1) focuses on the conduct element, (2) is narrowly tailored 
to an important government interest in restricting the conduct, and (3) 
leaves open ample alternative channels for expressing the message.201 The 
same rule should apply, the argument would go, to expressions of fact or 
opinion (pure speech) that are also situation-altering utterances (speech that 
ought to be treated as conduct).
But such a defense, I think, would miss the point:  In the examples 
given above, all aspects of the speech—both its informational and 
persuasive value, and any felt change in moral obligation that the speech 
might yield—should be constitutionally protected.
True, the speech may change people’s felt moral obligations by creating 
peer pressure, by taking advantage of professional norms, or by committing 
the speaker to act in a certain way lest he face charges of hypocrisy.  But 
even if the government’s aim in restricting the speech is only to prevent 
such changed moral obligations, the restriction should be unconstitutional, 
period (unless the speech falls within one of the exceptions to protection).  
There should be no need for any complicated and likely subjective inquiry 
into whether the prohibition would still leave the speaker relatively free to 
convey the bare factual or ideological assertions without the supposedly 
“situation-altering” factors.
C. The Problem of Agreements and Offers
Professor Greenawalt has certainly identified an important unresolved 
problem:  Judges, scholars, and others generally believe (and likely correct-
ly believe) that certain statements—“exercises of official authority, 
agreements, promises, orders, offers, manipulative inducements, and 
manipulative threats”202—are constitutionally unprotected; but neither the 
Supreme Court nor the legal academy has fully explained why this is so.203
I suspect that the problem isn’t that complex or novel for exercises of 
official authority, official orders, orders within a business, or orders within 
a criminal gang.  These are threats:  Do this or you’ll be fired, jailed, or 
perhaps even killed.204 Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language itself 
201 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
202 See GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 58.
203 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55-56 (1982) (reasoning that many 
though not all promises are constitutionally unprotected, but not explaining why this is so, 
or where the line should be drawn).
204 See id. at 65-66.
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acknowledges that direct threats should be analyzed as speech rather than as 
situation-altering utterance, and concludes (for good reason) that they 
should be unprotected speech.205  Likewise, the lack of protection given to 
manipulative threats can also be justified under the general threats 
exception, though I agree that this exception should be limited to exclude 
“warning threats.”206
For agreements, offers, and manipulative inducements (which are 
essentially a form of offer), the problem is considerably harder.207 I can’t 
claim to have a solution to the problem, and this may be reason to consider 
my criticisms of the “situation-uttering utterances” framework with some 
skepticism:  That framework, at least, proposes a solution, and I do not. Yet 
it seems to me that the expression of moral commitment does not itself 
suffice to make speech into nonspeech conduct.
Here, as elsewhere, it may be better to recognize that speech which 
conveys an offer or a promise—and certainly the broader range of speech 
that changes people’s felt moral obligations—is indeed speech, not merely 
conduct. Such speech sometimes does communicate facts and ideas.  It 
sometimes should be protected, for instance in the examples I mention 
above.  But it should also be sometimes restrictable for certain reasons, 
related to the harm that it can cause, and its likely lack of First Amendment 
value.  This is the very sort of analysis that Speech, Crime, and the Uses of 
Language itself applies to other kinds of speech, such as false statements of 
fact, unconditional threats, and solicitation of crime208—speech that should 
be restrictable even though it isn’t situation-altering.
But even if I’m mistaken, and even if agreements, offers, orders, and 
manipulative threats should be seen as conduct rather than speech, it’s 
important to recognize that this “situation-altering utterance” category is 
quite narrow.  Statements of fact and value remain speech, not conduct.  
Crime-facilitating speech, offensive speech, and copycat-inspiring speech 
all remain speech, even if one accepts the “situation-altering utterances” 
framework.
205 Id. at 90-91, 290-92.
206 See, e.g., id. at 91; see also John Sauer, Conditional Threats and the First 
Amendment (in draft); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (Ore. 1982); Wurtz v. Risley, 
719 F.2d 1438, 1443 (9th Cir. 1983).
207
 Agreements literally involve nothing but speech:  After all, a conspiracy is formed 
not by the agreement inside each conspirator’s heads, which coconspirators and jurors 
usually won’t learn about, but by the expression of that agreement to the coconspirators.  
Sometimes that expression could be wordless—as with a nod—or even entirely tacit.  But 
if there is a conspiracy, it must be that one conspirator’s action has intentionally expressed 
to another conspirator his agreement to work together.
208 See GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 110-18, 130-40, 260-80, 290-92, 314-27.
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V. THE UNCHARTED ZONES OF FREE SPEECH
I’ve argued above that when speech is restricted because of harms 
caused by its content, we ought not try to evade the First Amendment 
problem by simply renaming the speech “conduct.”  As Bill Van Alstyne 
has written, pointing to two examples:
Lying on the witness stand is not less speech than lying about the weather
. . ., although it may also be perjury.  The shout of “Fire!” is not less speech in 
the Holmes instance than the shout of “Fire!” from the mouth of an actor on 
the stage of the same theater, spoken as but a word in a play.  It is futile to 
argue that an appropriately tailored law that punishes any or all of these 
utterances does not abridge speech.  It does, it is meant to, and one should not 
take recourse to verbal subterfuge, e.g., that it is “speech-brigaded-with-
action” or “conduct” alone that is curtailed . . . .209
But what, then, of the classic examples of speech that people say ought 
to be restricted under this rubric?  Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association
followed its citation of Giboney by citing “exchange of securities 
information; corporate proxy statements; exchange of information among 
competitors; and employers’ threats of retaliation for employees’ labor 
activities” as evidence that “the State does not lose its power to regulate 
commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a 
component of that activity.”210  The Justice Department likewise followed 
its Giboney argument by citing “inchoate crimes” such as “conspiracy, 
facilitation, solicitation, bribery, coercion, blackmail, and aiding and 
abetting”211 as examples of speech that can be prohibited as conduct.212
Rice v. Paladin Press argued that “Were the First Amendment to bar or 
to limit government regulation of such ‘speech brigaded with action,’ the 
government would be powerless to protect the public from . . . extortion or 
blackmail[;] . . . threats and other improper influences in official and 
political matters[;] . . . perjury and various cognate crimes[;] . . . criminal 
solicitation[;] . . . conspiracy[;] . . . [criminal] harassment[;] . . . forgery[;] . . 
. successfully soliciting another to commit suicide . . .; and the like.”213
Some judicial opinions have likewise pointed to speech by professionals 
209
 William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. 
REV. 107, 114 (1982).  Van Alstyne is of course not condemning these speech 
restrictions—he is only condemning the attempt to deny that these are indeed speech 
restrictions.
210
 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
211 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying n.57.
212
 For a broader analysis of why these examples have long gone undiscussed, see 
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 
(2004).
213
 128 F.2d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997).
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said to their clients.214
The answer, it seems to me, is the one that First Amendment law 
generally gives:  There are exceptions to the First Amendment’s protection, 
and the courts ought to identify the boundaries of those exceptions.215 For 
instance, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio didn’t  deal with advocacy of 
illegal conduct simply by describing it as the “inchoate crime[]” of illegal 
advocacy, or by citing Giboney.216 Rather, the Court acknowledged that 
such advocacy is presumptively protected speech, and carefully defined the 
narrow circumstances under which such advocacy can be punished.217
Similarly, fraud, perjury, and forgery can be punished under the false 
statements of fact exception.218  “[E]mployers’ threats of retaliation for 
employees’ labor activities”219 and other threats could be punished under 
the threats exception.  These exceptions aren’t just special cases of a 
“conduct unprotected, speech protected” principle.  They are separately 
crafted rules that let the government punish speech in particular 
circumstances, based on arguments about the harm and value of speech that 
are specific to each exception.
214 See, e.g., SEC v. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“The power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the 
practice of a profession entails speech,” citing Giboney); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement 
of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of Psychiatry, 228 F.3d 1043, 1053-55 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(likewise).
215 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) (“As a 
general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or 
read or speak or hear.  The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain 
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography 
produced with real children.”).
216 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (suggesting in passing that 
“encouraging the commission of a crime” is indeed punishable, and citing the Giboney
language as supporting that position).
217
 I think solicitation of crime should be dealt with by modifying incitement doctrine.  
Solicitation, like incitement, is a form of crime advocacy; but it is generally aimed at one 
person and is unlikely to persuade or inform that person of any political ideas, and this 
might justify relaxing the imminence standard.  Cf. Cherry v. State, 306 A.2d 634, 639-41 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973).  But see People v. Salazar, 362 N.W.2d 913 (Mich. App. 
1985), which overturned a solicitation conviction on the grounds that the defendant was 
trying to solicit someone to commit a crime some time in the future, rather than 
imminently, citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  See generally Volokh, 
Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pts. II.C, IV.A.2.a, V.C (discussing why speech 
that is aimed solely at an audience that one knows to consist of criminals, and that is likely
to help bring about crime, should be unprotected).
218 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 
1829, 1841 (2003) (applying the false statements of fact exception to knowingly false 
statements even outside defamation law).
219 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Allentown Mack Sales & 
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 386 (1998).  
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The same goes for some of the examples that I cite in the Introduction.  
I suggest elsewhere,220 for instance, the proper boundaries of a “crime-
facilitating speech” exception under which some speech that might qualify 
as “facilitation” or “aiding and abetting” may be punished.221
These boundaries shouldn’t be those of the crime of criminal facilitation 
(generally defined as recklessly or knowingly, and sometimes even 
negligently, helping a criminal)222 or of aiding and abetting (generally 
defined as intentionally, or sometimes knowingly, helping a criminal).223
Not all such speech should be restrictable, even if may fit within the 
definitions of those crimes:  A chemistry textbook that describes how 
explosives are made, for instance, should be constitutionally protected even 
if it recklessly facilitates the construction of bombs by criminals.  Rather, 
the boundaries ought to be developed by considering the usual First 
Amendment factors—the value of the speech, 224 the harm that it causes, the 
difficulty of drawing certain lines, the risk that punishing some speech will 
deter other speech, and so on—and not just asking whether the speech 
constitutes “criminal conduct.”225
220
 Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3. 
221
 This may also justify restrictions on insiders’ leaks of information about securities.  
Such leaks are actually an example of crime-facilitating speech said to a small audience 
that the speaker knows is likely to use the speech for criminal purposes:  Trading based on 
inside information is illegal, and the tip provides information that lets people engage in 
such conduct.  See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pt. V.B (explaining 
why such speech may be restricted).
222 See supra note 4. 
223 See supra note 25.
224
 This of course implicates the perennial debates about what theory of First 
Amendment value courts should use.  See Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First 
Amendment Law 12 n.49 (draft) (citing the leading articles advocating for the various 
views).  The Supreme Court has been notoriously reluctant to resolve those debates, and to 
settle on any theory—self-government, search for truth, self-expression, and so on—as 
being the sole foundation of First Amendment law.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1617-19 
(1987); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a 
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1217-23 (1983).
I need not, however, take sides on this subject.  My argument here is simply that, 
whatever one thinks is the proper metric of First Amendment value, the decisions about 
what speech should be protected must turn on the factors I mention in the text (which 
include the value of the speech).  They should not turn on the characterization of speech as 
“conduct,” at least when the speech is being restricted precisely because of what it 
communicates, and the harms that may supposedly flow from that communication.
225 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3 (going through this analysis).  
One can of course argue that a good deal of such speech—or other speech, such as 
solicitation, agreements, and the like—should be unprotected on the grounds that it isn’t 
part of “public discourse,” a concept most prominently explored by Robert Post.  See
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
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The same is true, I think, for blackmail and coercion.  Some speech that 
might be called blackmail and coercion should surely be unprotected.  Other 
speech—for instance, “stop shopping at these white-owned stores, or we’ll 
publicize your noncompliance with our boycott” or “stop engaging in 
certain real estate selling practices, or we’ll distribute leaflets to your 
neighbors criticizing you”226—is constitutionally protected.  The lines 
between the protected and unprotected must be drawn, and scholars and 
courts have suggested such lines (which would presumably become part of 
the threats exception).227  But the lines can’t be drawn based simply on 
assertions that some speech is speech and other speech is conduct.
Some of the other categories haven’t gotten the attention that they 
deserve.  Conspiracy and bribery, for instance, involve agreements and 
offers of agreement.  Not everything that is called conspiracy or bribery 
should be unprotected:  A conspiracy to teach Communist doctrine or the 
propriety of polygamy228 or a conspiracy to obstruct the draft by persuading 
people that the draft is wrong229 should be protected.230  So should a bribe in 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 
(1990); Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 
1276 (1995); see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 44-48.  This inquiry is closely related, 
I think, to the inquiries I mention in the text, especially the value of the speech.  But as I 
argue in Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pt. II.B, much speech that 
helps people commit crime is indeed a potentially valuable contribution to public 
discourse.  The label “aiding and abetting” is not an adequate way of drawing the line 
between public discourse and other speech, or between valuable speech and valueless 
speech.
226 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Organization for a Better 
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).  See also Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419 (“The claim that the 
expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove 
them from the reach of the First Amendment.  Petitioners plainly intended to influence 
respondent’s conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the 
function of a newspaper.”).
227 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 91; Sauer, supra note 206; State v. 
Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (Ore. 1982); Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1443 (9th Cir. 
1983).
228 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction for 
conspiracy to teach Communist doctrine); State v. Musser, 175 P.2d 724, 731 (Utah 1946) 
(upholding conviction for conspiracy to teach the propriety of polygamy), vacated and 
remanded, 333 U.S. 95 (1948); TRIBE, supra note 39, at 846 (“Dennis is generally deemed 
to mark the temporary eclipse of the Holmes-Brandeis formulation of the clear and present 
danger test.”); John T. Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look at the Evolving 
Understanding of the First Amendment, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 48 (1994) (concluding that 
“The basic holding of Dennis was overruled” in Brandenburg v. Ohio); Vitiello, supra note 
30, at 1219 (“were Dennis or the World War I Era cases to arise today, the results would 
almost certainly be different”).
229 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (noting that Schenck was 
prosecuted for, among other things, conspiracy to obstruct the draft).
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the form of “If you vote for this law, our advocacy group will give you its 
valuable endorsement during the next election season,”231 or a candidate’s 
promise to refund to the county and thus to the voters some of his salary.232
As I suggest in Part IV.C, courts and commentators ought to explain how 
one can distinguish constitutionally unprotected promises from 
constitutionally protected ones—just as the law distinguishes
constitutionally unprotected personal insults, false statements of fact, or 
statements advocating illegal conduct from constitutionally protected
ones.233
The same goes for certain speech that might violate antitrust law or
securities law.234 For instance, as Justice Holmes recognized, it’s not 
obvious when the publication of price and production information should be 
constitutionally unprotected235 (as opposed to just being admissible as 
evidence to prove that price-setting was actually price-fixing236).  But
wherever the lines should be drawn, these decisions can’t just be made by 
saying that such speech constitutes the conduct of attempted 
monopolization, just as lobbying for anticompetitive legislation can’t be 
outlawed on the grounds that it constitutes attempted monopolization.237
230 See GREENAWALT, supra note 174, at 64, 335-37.
231 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of 
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 809-11 (1985) (discussing this issue).
232
 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1982).
233 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
234 See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital 
Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 40-63 (1989) (outlining some principles for analyzing 
securities laws under the First Amendment); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 
F.2d 793, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1985) (Winter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that proxy solicitation 
rules can’t constitutionally be applied to certain kinds of speech).
235 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 413 (1921) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting).  Cf. also National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-99 (1978), which upheld a Sherman Act injunction barring a 
professional society “from adopting any official opinion, policy statement, or guideline 
stating or implying that competitive bidding is unethical.”  The Court justified the 
injunction on the ground that the Society had already been found guilty of illegally entering 
into agreements prohibiting competitive bidding, id. at 684 & n.5, and that courts have the 
power “to fashion appropriate restraints” to prevent and to remedy such illegal behavior.  It 
seems to me that without some such illegal past agreement, an organization’s claims about 
business ethics—for instance, claims that it’s unethical for professionals or businesses to 
deal with oppressive governments or to employ cheap foreign labor—would be 
constitutionally protected even if some law purported to condemn them as attempted 
“restraint of trade.”
236 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1993) (holding that speech may be 
used of evidence of criminal intent or of physical behavior); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 
631, 642 (1947) (same).
237 See Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United 
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Treason poses a similar sort of problem.  Some speech may well be 
treasonous, even if we set aside speech that reveals state secrets238 or tells 
the enemy the sailing dates of troopships.239  Axis Sally, for instance, was 
rightly punished for broadcasting, while working for the Nazis, a radio 
program aimed at decreasing the morale of American soldiers.240
But at the same time, much speech that does help the enemy must 
remain constitutionally protected.  During war as during peace, Americans 
have a right and responsibility to evaluate their government’s actions, and 
decide whether the actions—or the administration—need changing.  To 
make these decisions we need to hear various views on whether the war is 
going well, whether we’re morally in the right in our actions, and so on.
An American during the Vietnam War, for instance, should have had the 
right to argue to his fellow citizens that the war was unwinnable, that the 
U.S. should pull out, and that voters should support an antiwar candidate.241
His arguments and others like his might well have helped the enemy, if they 
weakened U.S. resolve, made it more likely that the U.S. would indeed 
withdraw, or emboldened the Viet Cong. Moreover, if he thought the Viet 
Cong was in the right, he might well have wanted and intended the enemy 
to win.
Still, his speech should probably have been protected, even despite his 
intent to help our enemies.  The speech might well have contributed 
valuable arguments to an important public debate, regardless of his 
intentions.  And even if his intentions made him morally culpable and thus 
theoretically deserving of punishment, in practice prohibiting all speech that 
intentionally helps the enemy risks punishing even speakers who intend 
only to protect American interests, but whose intentions are mistaken by 
prosecutors and juries.242
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  For an example of an article that takes 
this First Amendment issue seriously, see Stephen G. Thompson, Antitrust, the First 
Amendment, and the Communication of Price Information, 56 TEMPLE L.Q. 939 (1983).
238 See R.A.V. v. City of St.  Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (suggesting that such may 
be treason).  As to speech that reveals secrets that the speaker has promised not to reveal, 
see United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995) (upholding criminal punishment for 
releasing confidential information, on the grounds that “As to one who voluntarily assumed 
a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject to the 
same stringent standards that would apply to efforts to impose restrictions on unwilling 
members of the public.”); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that the 
First Amendment doesn’t give people a right to breach nondisclosure agreements); Snepp 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (likewise).
239 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) .
240 See, e.g., Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
241 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; Tom Bell, Treasonous Speech, 
Technology, and the First Amendment (in draft).
242 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pt. IV.B.2 (pointing out the 
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Perhaps the proper test is whether the speaker was getting paid by the 
enemy243 or otherwise coordinated his actions with the enemy.244  Perhaps 
it’s whether the speech was aimed at American voters generally or whether 
it was aimed at soldiers specifically.  Perhaps it’s something else altogether; 
or perhaps I’m mistaken, and a sound First Amendment analysis would 
conclude that the pro-Viet Cong speech I describe should indeed have been 
unprotected.
But again the problem should be solved by recognizing that treason law 
as applied to such speech is indeed a speech restriction, and inquiring 
whether the success of the war effort and the protection of our soldiers 
justifies restricting the speech.  It’s a mistake to try to avoid the First 
Amendment problem by categorically concluding that speech which helps 
the enemy is conduct rather than speech, or that treasonous speech is 
unproblematically punishable because the treason statute is a law of general 
applicability.
Finally, courts need to develop First Amendment standards for 
regulations of professionals’ speech to clients;245 and here too Giboney and 
the speech/conduct distinction is an inadequate tool for helping develop 
such standards. Most of what many lawyers, investment advisors, 
accountants, psychotherapists, and even doctors do is speech.  Even if we 
conclude that speech in special government-created fora, such as 
courtrooms, should be treated differently from other speech, many lawyer-
client relationships consist simply of lawyers’ advising their clients.246
Such speech, I think, should be subject to greater regulation than speech 
to the public at large.  For instance, licensing requirements for professionals 
who give personalized advice should probably be constitutionally 
permissible;247 rules that one needs a license to write self-help books should 
shortcomings of intent standards in free speech law).
243
 This might indeed be a sort of conduct/speech distinction, but one that is focused on 
what is truly a conduct element (receipt of money) rather than the content of what the 
speech communicates.
244 See United States v. Chandler, 171 F.2d 921, 939 (1st Cir. 1948) (focusing on both 
these elements).
245
 For a fine analysis of this issue, see Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: 
Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885 (2000).
246 See id. at 893 (“When a professional does no more than render advice to a client, 
the government’s interest in protecting the public from fraudulent or incompetent practice 
is quite obviously directed at the expressive component of the professional’s practice rather 
than the nonexpressive component (if such a component even exists).”).  See also Daniel 
Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of 
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999) (generally discussing professional 
speech); Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and 
the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201 (1994) (likewise).
247 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of 
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not be.  Likewise, seemingly unsound advice by a lawyer—including advice 
that’s based on what the profession may view as unreasonable predictions, 
even when no false statements of fact are involved—should be regulable.  
Equally bad recommendations in books and radio programs ought not be.248
Similarly, laws that constrain the sexual choices of authors of advice
books, or of movie stars who project an image of trustworthiness, would 
violate both the First Amendment249 and the Lawrence v. Texas sexual 
autonomy right.250  Rules restricting psychotherapists from having sex with 
their clients, on the other hand, are likely constitutional.251  When a 
professional “takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to 
exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s 
individual needs and circumstances,”252 the government may properly try to 
shield the client from the professional’s incompetence or abuse of trust.
At the same time, it’s far from clear that the government should be 
completely free to regulate speech by professionals to their clients.  For 
instance, I doubt that the government may simply ban doctors from 
informing patients that marijuana is the best solution to their problems.253
Perhaps doctors could be prevented from writing recommendations that, by 
operation of state law, free patients from state liability for marijuana 
possession, though even that’s not clear.254  But I’m fairly certain that 
Psychiatry, 228 F.3d 1043, 1053-55 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding licensing requirement for 
psychoanalysts).  But see Kry, supra note 246, at 967-73 (arguing the contrary).
248 See, e.g., Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125-26 (Pa. Super. 1989).
249
 A restriction on the behavior of people who speak on certain subject matters should 
be at least as unconstitutional as a tax on people who speak on certain subject matters.  See
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228-30 (1987).
250
 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
251 See Caddy v. State, 764 So.2d 625, 629-30 (Fla. App. 2000) (holding that such 
restrictions don’t violate the Florida Constitution’s sexual autonomy guarantee as to current 
patients, and as to former patients when applied “on a case by case basis with consideration 
given to the nature, extent, and context of the professional relationship between the 
physician and the person,” though holding unconstitutional a flat ban on all sexual 
relationships with ex-patients).
252
 SEC v. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
253 See Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking 
Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 852, 863-64, 866-67 (1996) (arguing that 
physician-patient speech should generally be constitutionally protected, at least when it 
conveys valuable knowledge to the patient).
254 See Kry, supra note 246, at 894-95.  Compare Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 
681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Giboney in the course of concluding that “If physicians’
conduct, which could include speech, rises to the level of aiding and abetting or conspiracy, 
in violation of valid federal statutes, such conduct is punishable under federal law,” without 
explaining when recommending marijuana constitutes aiding and abetting or conspiracy 
and when it doesn’t), Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(likewise), and Petition for Certiorari, Walters v. Conant, No. 03-40, at 20 (filed June 7, 
2003, by the Solicitor General) (likewise) with Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637-38 
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doctors at least have the constitutional right to inform their patients of the 
medical benefits of marijuana, and to urge the patients to lobby their 
legislators to enact a medical marijuana exception.
Likewise, I doubt that it would be constitutional for the government to 
prohibit psychotherapists or family counselors from telling their patients 
that divorce may be the best solution, or to ban the counselors from 
advocating (or condemning) interracial marriages or adoptions.  The 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey Court may have been right to reject the 
doctors’ First Amendment objection to the informed consent requirement.  
But the plurality opinion’s dismissal of the objection was likely too quick:
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment 
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and 
childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State.  To be sure, the physician’s 
First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977), but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to 
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 
589, 603 (1977). We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that 
the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.255
Maybe there should generally be no restrictions on government-compelled 
speech in the professional-client relationship, perhaps because such speech 
compulsions don’t keep the client from being informed.  But if the 
government prohibited doctors from informing their patients about all the 
possible abortion procedures (including legal ones), or even about 
procedures that are not themselves constitutionally protected, such a 
prohibition may well be unconstitutional.256
Courts, then, need to answer some First Amendment questions here.  
First, in which kinds of relationship should speech be more regulable?  For 
instance, what about professor-student relationships, career advisor-advisee 
relationships, or fortuneteller-client relationships?257  Second, should the 
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding such speech constitutionally protected) and id. at 643-44 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (stressing that a prohibition on such speech violated the patients’ 
rights as listeners as well as the doctors’ rights as speakers).
255
 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality).
256 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), upheld a restriction on government-funded
doctors informing patients about abortions; but the Court’s decision rested entirely on the 
restriction’s being a condition attached to funding—nothing in the case suggests that the 
result would be the same if the ban applied to all doctors, including privately funded ones.
257
 Several courts have struck down bans on fortunetelling on First Amendment 
grounds, concluding that such bans are content-based restrictions on the fortuneteller’s 
constitutionally protected opinions and predictions; none considered whether the 
fortuneteller-client relationship should be subject to lower scrutiny because the 
fortuneteller is a professional advisor.  See Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Spiritual Psychic Science Church Of Truth, Inc. v. City Of Azusa, 703 P.2d 
1119 (1985) (applying the California Constitution’s free speech provision), disapproved in
part on other grounds, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 318 (2002); Trimble v. City of 
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special doctrine be limited to personalized advice, or would more general 
advice to the public also be more regulable?  Third, what should the test be:  
Should it give the government a free hand?  Should it only allow restrictions 
aimed at protecting clients from negligence or undue pressure?
Again, though, whatever the right result might be, the “conduct-speech” 
distinction is likely to be more misleading than helpful.  When the 
government restricts professionals from speaking to their clients, it’s 
restricting speech, not conduct. And it’s restricting the speech precisely 
because of the message that it communicates, or the harms that may flow 
from this message.258
The restriction is not a “legitimate regulation of professional practice 
with only incidental impact on speech”;259 the impact on the speech is the 
purpose of the restriction, not just an incidental matter.  The restriction may 
be valid, but for reasons having to do with the harm that negligent speech 
can cause, the potential value to the patient or to third parties of mandated 
speech, or the danger that the speech may make the patient psychologically 
dependent on the speaker—not because the regulated speech is somehow 
conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
It’s often tempting to dismiss First Amendment problems by labeling.  
“It’s not speech,” the argument goes, “it’s conduct / contempt / libel / 
sedition / aiding and abetting / professional speech.”  Sometimes, the 
New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D. La. 1999); Angeline v. Mahoning County Agr. Soc., 
993 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040 
(E.D. Wis. 1997).
I’ve found only one case that allowed government regulations of professional-client 
speech and considered the relevance of the fortune-telling cases—National Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of Psychiatry, 228 F.3d 1043, 1056 n.9 
(9th Cir. 2000), which cited Spiritual Psychic Science Church and distinguished it on the 
grounds that “California’s licensing scheme does not prohibit psychoanalysis [as did the 
anti-fortunetelling ordinance], but merely regulates who can engage in it for a fee.”  This, 
though, can’t be the right distinction by itself:  If speech is protected from a content-based 
ban, then it’s also normally protected from a content-based requirement that all people who 
engage in such speech for money be licensed and trained.  Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116-18 (1991).  Rather, the 
distinction must be that the government has more authority to regulate psychotherapist-
patient speech than fortuneteller-client speech.
258 See supra note 246.
259
 SEC v. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).  
See also Oregon Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793, 801 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding 
unauthorized practice of law statute on the grounds that it focuses only on “the conduct of a 
profession—the practice of law”); State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 648-49 (N.D. 1986) 
(likewise).
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dismissal is sound:  For instance, some behavior is indeed conduct that is 
punished because of its noncommunicative elements, not because of what it 
communicates.260  And often the label does capture something important
even as to speech, though only as a step in the First Amendment inquiry:  
Some speech that constitutes aiding and abetting or common-law libel is 
indeed unprotected, for reasons related to why criminal law or tort law 
seeks to punish it.261
But sometimes the label is used as a substitute for serious First 
Amendment analysis, rather than as the starting point for it; hence the 
Court’s repeated complaint about the government’s trying to “foreclose the 
exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels,”262 such as by labeling 
speech “solicitation,” “contempt,” or “breach of the peace.”  Sometimes 
such attempts are made by people who want to justify restricting certain 
kinds of speech.  Sometimes they’re made by people who want to protect 
other kinds of speech, and who therefore articulate supposedly absolutist 
First Amendment rules—for instance, Justice Black’s “no law means no 
law”263—and dismiss inconvenient counterexamples by calling them mere 
“conduct.”264
I have argued above that we should resist this temptation.  When the law 
restricts speech because of what the speech communicates—because the 
speech causes harms by persuading, informing, or offending—we shouldn’t 
deny that the law is a speech restriction, and requires some serious 
justification.
Such justifications may at times be available.  The Court has so held as 
to incitement, false statements of fact, obscenity, threats, and other 
260 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
261 See, e.g., Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at pt. V.B.
262
 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (referring to the label “solicitation”); 
see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“In deciding the 
question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to 
the epithet ‘libel’ than we have to other ‘mere labels’ of state law. Like insurrection, 
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal 
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been 
challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional 
limitations.”).
263 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., 
concurring); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 512 (1994).
264 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 457 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that “speech is . . . immune from prosecution,” and distinguishing falsely 
shouting fire in a crowded theatre on the grounds that such a shout is “speech brigaded with 
action”); id. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring) (endorsing Justice Douglas’s opinion); Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.) 
(reasoning that profanity on a person’s jacket is unprotected because it’s “mainly conduct 
and little speech”); Van Alstyne, supra note 136, at 114 n.15 (rightly faulting Justice Black 
for this approach).
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unprotected categories of speech.  Courts should also develop similar rules 
for certain kinds of crime-facilitating speech, professional speech, 
treasonous speech, and so on.  But courts and scholars ought to develop 
these rules with the recognition that the rules are indeed speech 
restrictions—not by asserting that the rules merely restrict “conduct.”
